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RECENT DECISIONS
tion by reasonably deferring the unqualified enjoyment of the principal of his devise or bequest without explaining to the beneficiary and
to the public his reasons for doing so.

As has been shown, until recently the testator's intention has either
been ignored as insignificant and unimportant, or explained away by
facile statement that the testator must be presumed to have known the
law and intended to give the beneficiaries the right of election. This
idea of conclusive presumption of intent was carried so far in New
York that, as was noted, the legislature was forced to change the rule
adopted by the courts of that state.5 3 It is significant that other states
have not required such action. As the New Hampshire court said: 11
. . . there seems no need to invoke a legislative act here to accomplish the desired result.
Our courts are not disposed to follow arbitrary rules, English or
otherwise, at what appears to be the expense of justice.

Doubtless there may be cases where it will prove a hardship to insist
that the beneficiary take the annuity instead of the principal sum, but
it is not the province of the courts to say whether or not the testator's
wishes were wise. That the courts will continue to enforce these annuity provisions according to the intent of the testator seems assured.
William M. Dickson
William B. Wombacher
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ADmINISTRATIVE LAW-RAILWAY LABOR ACT-JURISDICTION OF
STATE COURTS TO ADJUDICATE DISPUTEs ARISING UNDER AcT.--Slocum
v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R.. .... U. S ..... , 70 S. Ct. 577, .L.
Ed .....

(1950).
The railroad had separate bargaining contracts with the
Telegraphers union and the Clerks union. There arose between the
two unions a jurisdictional dispute as to which contract controlled
certain yard jobs of the railroad. Upon being confronted with these
claims at the bargaining table, the railroad agreed with the contention
that the jobs were embraced in the Clerks contract. The Telegraphers'
chairman, Slocum, protested. He claimed back pay for certain workers, and urged re-assignment of the jobs to members of his union. At
this juncture the procedure normally would have been to petition the
Adjustment Board under Section 3 of the Railroad Labor Act, 44
STAT. 578 (1926), as amended, 48 STAT. 1189 (1934), 45 U. S. C. §
153 (1946), which provides:
53 See notes 36 and 38 supra.
54 Bedell v. Colby et al., supra note 46, 54 A. (2d) at 163.
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The disputes . . . shall be handled in the usual manner [at the bargaining table] up to and including the chief operating officer of the
carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of
the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

Instead of following this statutory procedure, the railroad filed a suit
for a declaratory judgment in a New York state court. Both unions
were named as defendants. The relief prayed for was an interpretation of both agreements, a declaration that the Clerks' agreement
covered the jobs in question, and that the Telegraphers must refrain
from making similar claims under its contract. The Telegraphers
motion to dismiss on grounds that the Railway Labor Act left the
state court without jurisdiction was denied. A trial was had. The
court interpreted the contracts as the railroad had urged, and granted
decrees in accordance with the railroad's request. The Appellate
Division affirmed, 274 App. Div. 950, 83 N. Y. S. (2d) 513, (1948),
which in turn was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of New York.
299 N. Y. 496, 87 N. E. (2d) 532 (1949). The Supreme Court of
the United States in the instant case reversed the New York courts,
holding that the jurisdiction of the Board to adjust grievances and
disputes of the type here involved is exclusive.
In its decision the Court followed Order of Ry. Conductors of
America. et al. v. Pitney et al., 326 U. S. 561, 66 S. Ct. 322, 90 L.
Ed. 318 (1946), and distinguished Moore v. Illinois Central R. R.,
312 U. S. 630, 61 S. Ct. 754, 85 L. Ed. 1089 (1941). It must be noted
that these two cases are the basis of the opposite decisions of the New
York courts with that of the instant case. To clearly understand the
principal case, the necessity of interpreting the Moore and Pitney decisions is apparent.
The facts of the Pitney case, are remarkably similar to the case at
hand. While proceedings for reorganization of a railroad under Section
77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), as amended, 11 U.
S. C. § 205 (1946), were pending in the district court, the trustees
agreed with the bargaining representative of yard conductors that five
trains should be manned by yard rather than road conductors. Relying
on earlier agreements, the bargaining representative of the road conductors petitioned the court to instruct the trustees not to displace the
road conductors, and to enjoin such action as long as the earlier agreements were not altered in accordance with the Railway Labor Act.
The court took jurisdiction, determined that the yard conductors were
entitled to operate the trains in question, and dismissed the petition.
The circuit court of appeals affirmed. 145 F. (2d) 351 (3d Cir. 1944).
The Supreme Court of the United States modified, holding that insofar
as the order constituted instructions to the trustees, it was within the
supervisory power of the district court as a bankruptcy court, and that
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part of the order was affirmed. But it was further stated that the district court should not have interpreted the agreements for the purposes
of finally adjudicating the dispute between the unions and the railroad, but should stay dismissal of the cause so as to afford opportunity
for application to the Adjustment Board for an interpretation of agreements pursuant to the Railway Labor Act. The court said, 326 U. S.
at 567:
The factual question is intricate and technical. An agency especially
competent and specifically designated to deal with it 'has been created
by Congress. .
. the court should exercise equitable discretion to give
that agency the first opportunity to pass on the issue. . . . The court
of equity should, therefore, in the exercise of its discretion stay its
hand (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court in the instant case in speaking of the Pitney case says,

70 S. Ct. at 579:
. . . in Order of Conductors v. Pitney . . . we held . . . that the
federal District Court in its equitable discretion should have refused
"to adjudicate a jurisdictional dispute involving the railroad and two
. . . bargaining agents . . ." Our ground for this -holding was that
the court "should not have interpreted the contracts . . ." but should
have left this question for determination by the Adjustment Board, a
congressionally designated agency peculiarly competent in this field ...
This reasoning equally supports a denial of power in any court-state
as well as federal-to invade the jurisdiction conferred on the Adjustment Board by the Railway Labor Act.

But the Court of Appeals of New York interpreted the Pitney case
quite differently, 299 N. Y. 496, 87 N. E. (2d)

532 (1949),

under-

standing that decision to give the courts discretionary jurisdiction. The
New York court said, 87 N. E. (2d) at 536:
• . . the Pitney case . . . recognized the concurrent jurisdiction of the
board and the courts to interpret the contracts, but -held that the
equity court in the exercise of its discretion should have stayed its
hand under the circumstances of that case...

In Moore v. Illinois Central R. R., supra, an employee sued the
railroad allegig wrongful discharge. It was held by the Supreme Court
that an administrative finding was not prerequisite to filing a suit in
court for wrongful discharge. The Court stated in its opinion, 312
U. S. at 634:
. . . we find nothing in the Act which purports to take away from
the courts the jurisdiction to determine a controversy . . . or to
make an administrative finding a prerequisite to filing a suit in court.
• . . It is to be noted that . . . § 153 (i), as amended in 1934, provides no more than that disputes "may be referred . . . to the . . .
Board. . . ." It is significant that . . . the 1926 Railway Labor Act
. . . had, before the 1934 amendment, provided that upon failure . . .
to reach an adjustment a "dispute shall be referred to the . . . Board
...
"
This difference in language, substituting "may" for "shall", . . .
was . . . a clarification of the law's original purpose. . . . neither . . .
Act . . . indicates that the machinery provided for settling disputes was
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based on a philosophy of legal compulsion. On the contrary, the legislative history of fhe . . . Act shows a consistent purpose . . . to establish and maintain a system for peaceful adjustment and mediation
voluntary in its nature.

The Moore case was distinguished in the instant case. The Court
proceeded on the premise, 70 S. Ct. at 580, that Moore:
• . . chose to accept the railroad's action in discharging him as final,
thereby ceasing to be an employee. . . A common-law or statutory
action for wrongful discharge differs from any remedy which the Board
has power to provide, and does not involve questions of future relations
between the railroad and its other employees.

However, the New York Court of Appeals construed the Moore case
to hold that the jurisdiction of the Board is not exclusive.
Another case, Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley et al., 325 U. S. 711, 65
S. Ct. 1282, 89 L. Ed. 1886 (1945), held that courts were not deprived
of their jurisdiction in suits where employees sue the carrier, although
the employment relationship still existed.
Still other courts have interpreted the Moore case. The United
States court of appeals in Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F.
(2d) 235 (D. C. Cir. 1941), aff'd per curiam, 319 U. S. 732, 63 S. Ct.
1430, 87 L. Ed. 1694 (1943), said:
. . the
t carrier, under the decision in Moore v. Illinois Central R. R.,
supra, can bring its suit on the contract, independently of the statute,
prior to the time when the dispute is submitted to the Board.

The decision in the instant case introduces three problems: (1) the
taking away of what has always been the prerogative of the courts,
namely the interpreting of contracts as to matters of law; (2) the
question of whether a ruling of the board is subject to judicial review;
(3) a disregard of the rules of statutory interpretations. These three
points are the basis for the vigorous dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice
Reed.
It is not given to argument that the power to interpret contractual
relationships has always rested with the courts. The interpretation of
a writing is for a court. Hamilton v. Insurance Company, 136 U. S.
242, 10 S. Ct. 945, 34 L. Ed. 419. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 8
(1932).
As to the court's power to review administrative findings, Mr. Justice Reed presses hard to point out that, although the majority expressly states that its decision does not withhold the right to judicial
review, nevertheless its practical effect is to withhold it. He states that
it is highly questionable under the provisions of the act whether any
appeal can be had from Board action or inaction.
The question of statutory interpretation is brought to bear on the
case by the- dissent. This question is not even broached by the ma-
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jority in the instant case. It is carefully avoided. Ignored by the
Court is the legislative history of the Act--changing the 1926 obligatory "shall be referred ' to the 1934 permissive "may be referred." In
by-passing the historical aspect of the act, the Court seems to have enabled itself to disregard a basic rule of statutory interpretation-namely, that words be given their common meaning unless defined as having
a different meaning. In the Moore case the Court used this change
of words as its most forceful argument. That opinion would have been
substantially weak if not illogical without it. On reason, nothing in
the act stating the contrary, the construction of the Moore case, and
the dissent in the instant case is the correct one.
It appears that the principal case is a reversal of the Pitney and
Moore cases, and a misinterpretation of the letter and spirit of Section
3 of the Railway Labor Act.
Jack Fena

CHARITrEs-Im uNiTy OF CHARITABLE CoRPoRATIONS FROM LiABILITY FOR TORTS OF THrin AGENTS.-Moore v. Moyle et al . .... Ill.
__, 92 N. E. (2d) 81 (1950). Action by Agnes Moore against J.
Moyle, B. Bramlage, and Bradley Polytechnic Institute, a charitable
corporation, to recover damages for personal injuries. The lower
court dismissed the action against Bradley University and the plaintiff appeals.
In 1940, the plaintiff was a student at Bradley and the individual defendants were instructors in its physical education department. Bradley had purchased a trapeze to be used in the approaching college circus. The plaintiff was practicing on the trapeze, preparing for the circus, when it collapsed, allowing her to fall some
twenty feet to a hardwood floor where she was injured.

Her complaint rested upon res ipsa loquitur, negligence, and contract. She alleged that Bradley was fully insured against the risk
involved here and that the judgment, if obtained, would not impair
or diminish any funds held by Bradley in trust for charitable purposes. A motion to dismiss was filed by Bradley, averring it was
a charitable corporation, and therefore not liable for the torts of
its agents. The trial court entered an order striking all counts as
to Bradley, and all except negligence as to the individual defendants.
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the actual trust funds
of charitable corporations are immune from liability for the torts
of the corporation's employees and agents. Beyond this, they said,
the rule of respondeat superior is in effect. In effect, this means
that a charitable corporation is liable in an action if the judgment

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
can be collected from non-trust funds. If the corporation has nothing
but trust funds the action will not lie, but if the corporation has
non-trust funds or is protected by insurance then the action will lie.
The main issues in the case are: whether the charitable corporation's immunity from liability for the torts of its agents is absolute;
and if not, does an action lie against the charitable corporation if
it has non-trust funds or is protected by insurance.
The authorities on the subject of liability of charitable corporations for the torts of their agents are extremely divergent. Tucker v.
Mobile Infirmary Ass'n., 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Fordyce
and McKee v. Woman's Christian Nat. Library Ass'n., 79 Ark. 550,
96 S. W. 155 (1906); Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233,
92 N. E. 626 (1910). However, as a general rule, it can be stated
that these corporations are exempt from liability for tort where the
injured person is a recipient of the bounty of the charity, and in
some instances where the injured is not the recipient of the charity.
Parks v. Northwestern Univ., 218 IIl. 381, 75 N. E. 991 (1905);
Eighmy v. Union Pac. Ry., 93 Iowa 538, 61 N. W. 1056 (1895);
Gable et al. v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 AtI. 1087
(1910).
There are many theories for the basis of the immunity. Among
them are: implied waiver or assent to immunity by the acceptance
of benefits; protection of trust-funds; public policy; performance of
public function; and prevention of the frustration of the donor's
intention of the charity. The Illinois Court has always followed the
theory of protecting the trust funds from being diverted for a purpose not contemplated by the donor. Hogan v. Chicago Lying-InHospital, 335 IIl. 42, 166 N. E. 461 (1929); Lenahen v. Ancilla
Domini Sisters, 331 Ill. App. 27, 72 N. E. (2d) 445 (1947).
Some jurisdictions hold absolutely that no liability attaches in
any event against a charitable corporation for the torts of its agents.
They base their holding on public policy. Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453 (1907). Other jurisdictions
recognize no immunity from liability in any case. Geiger v. Simpson
M. E. Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N. W. 463 (1928); Hewett v.
Woman's Hospital Aid Ass'n., 73 N. H. 556, 64 Atl. 190 (1906);
Sheehan v. North Country Comm. Hospital et al., 273 N. Y. 163,
7 N. E. (2d) 28 (1937). The majority of jurisdictions, however,
while reasoning along the lines of public policy, limit the immunity
from liability to cases where there has been no negligence on the
part of the corporation in the selecting and keeping of the agents
or employees who caused the damage. Thornton v. Franklin Square
House, 200 Mass. 465, 86 N. E. 909 (1909); De Groot v. Edison
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Institute, 306 Mich. 339, 10 N. W. (2d) 907 (1943); Gitzkoffen
v. Sisters of Holy Cross Hospital Assn., 32 Utah 46, 88 Pac. 691
(1907).
Where the court in the instant case seems to condition the liability of the corporation on the presence of insurance to cover the
particular injury its reasoning appears questionable. The majority
tried to distinguish the point by reasoning that the presence of insurance had no bearing on the liability, that it merely affects the collectibility of the judgment. It cites Parks v. Northwestern University, supra, as holding that charitable corporations are not absolutely
immune from liability for the torts of its agents. Immunity is allowed
there only to protect trust funds. Since the immunity is allowed only
to protect the trust funds and the trust funds are protected by insurance, then there is no need for the immunity. The argument appears
to be specious since it goes right back to saying that the presence
or absence of insurance is the determining factor of whether the
action will lie.
Had the plaintiff failed to allege the presence of the insurance
to protect the charitable trust funds, the appeal would probably
have been affirmed-for a dismissal. The only conclusion that can
be drawn is that insurance is the determining factor of the case.
An insurance company is nothing more than a surety for the
insured. The insurer should be held liable only for what the insured
is protected against and for which it can be held legally responsible.
Illinois has always held that when the principal is discharged the
surety is discharged. Bank of America et al. v. Jorjorian, 303 Ill.
App. 184, 24 N. E. (2d) 896 (1940). In the case under discussion,
the insured or the principal is not liable but the surety or the
insurer is liable. The holding seems contrary to the Illinois law of
suretyship.
If insurance had nothing to do with liability and is related to
collectibility only, then insurance should not have been discussed
in the case. The appeal was only to determine if there was a cause
of action against the charitable corporation. Insurance being concerned only with collectibility of a judgment, it could be relevant
only if judgment was attained. Collectibility of a judgment has never
had any bearing on the legal rights of the parties.
The majority opinion, in the case under discussion, claimed to be
following the Parks case as far as it went, and to have extended
it to fit this case. The dissent believed the majority opinion to be
contrary to that decision. The vast majority of text writers maintain
that the Parks case grants absolute immunity. That case states:
"The doctrine of respondeat superior does not extend to charitable
institutions . . ." If respondeat superior does not 'extend to char-
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itable corporations it would be impossible for them to be held liable
for the acts of their employees or agents. Therefore, the Parks case
holds much more than that the immunity exists only to protect the
trust funds, as the majority opinion contended it held.
It seems impossible to arrive at the conclusion of the majority
without over-ruling the Parks case. It also seems impossible to state
there is a cause of action without predicating it upon the presence
of liability insurance. But this court, backed by a case which held
absolute immunity and the court's own statement that insurance has
no bearing on legal liability, held this cause of action good against
a charitable corporation if its funds were protected by liability insurance. It is submitted that logic was neglected in the reasoning of
this decision.
R. Emmett Fitzgerald

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-ADEQUATE

REPRESENTATION

BY COUNSEL

A CRIMINAL PRoSEcuTiN.--Schmittler v. State, .-. nd ..... , 93
N. E. (2d) 184 (1950). An affidavit was filed in the Posey Circuit
Court on March 30, 1949 charging the appellant with second degree burglary and grand larceny, committed on or about March 28,
1949. The accused, a boy of twenty-one, had never before been in
court, and until the time of entering his plea had no opportunity
to discuss with any person, his predicament and position, with reference to the criminal charges against him. His mother had visited
him on March 31, 1949, but did not employ counsel at the time,
thinking that the case was to be dropped, as she had reimbursed
the owner of the property for his alleged loss. On April 1, 1949,
appellant entered a plea of guilty, after talking to an attorney in
the courtroom for fifteen minutes. This attorney was paid the sum
of five dollars for his services, for which he made a brief statement of
216 words, asking the judge for clemency. When the plea of guilty
was entered, the grand larceny count was dismissed, and the appellant was sentenced on the burglary charge to the Indiana Reformatory.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court, denying
appellant a petition for a writ of error coram nobis against the
State of Indiana, appellee. The appellant has assigned as error that
at the time of entering his plea of guilty he was inadequately represented by counsel and was not informed of his constitutional rights
by his attorney.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court,
holding that the evidence sustained the finding that petitioner was
IN
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represented by competent counsel of his own choosing, and made
his guilty plea voluntarily and by such plea waived any deprivation
of rights.
It is to be presumed, stated the majority, that this lawyer did
his duty and properly represented his client, unless there be clear
and convincing proof to the contrary. Fambles v. State, 97 Ga. 625,
25 S. E. 365 (1895). Where a defendant is represented by competent counsel, a failure to assert or claim constitutional rights is
treated as a waiver. Irvin v. State, 220 Ind. 228, 41 N. E. (2d) 809
(1942).
The dissenting opinion vigorously attacked the conclusion reached
by the majority, premising its arguments on two basic points: (1) that
counsel was inadequate, and did not have sufficient time to prepare
a defense; (2) that appellant's constitutional rights have been denied.
Concerning appellant's constitutional right to counsel, IND. CoNsT.
ART. 1, § 13 provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right . .. to be heard by himself and counsel . . ."
This same right is guaranteed by the 6th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The spirit of these constitutional
provisions, requires that an accused must have something more than
a perfunctory representation. That this spirit is followed by the
courts is illustrated by the pertinent statement made by the court in
Castro v. State, 196 Ind. 385, 147 N. E. 321, 323 (1925):
And mere perfunctory action by an attorney assuming to represent
one accused of crime which falls short of presenting the evidence favorable to him and invoking the rules of law intended to prevent
conviction for an offense of which the accused is innocent, or the
imposition of a penalty more severe than is deserved, should not be
tolerated.

The accused must be advised by competent counsel as to his legal
and constitutional rights before he is in a position to freely and
understandingly enter -his plea. Rhodes v. State, 199 Ind. 183, 156
N. E. 389 (1927).
It must be remembered that the attorney's obligation to his client
is the same, whether he is paid by the county or the accused,
whether he is paid much or little, or nothing at all. The accused
has the right to expect that his counsel would make a sufficiet
investigation of the facts to understandingly advise the appellant
on entering a plea of guilty. Canon 5, CANONS OF ETHICS OF THE
A
icAN BAR AssOcIATION, states:
Having undertaken such defense, the lawyer is bound by all fair
and honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the
land permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or
liberty, but by due process of law.

In the instant case, the appellant's attorney merely made a cursory plea for clemency. He asked for no continuance for an inves-
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tigation of the facts. His representation was "perfunctory, passive,
and casual." Abraham et al. v. State,-- Ind..... , 91 N. E. (2d) 358
(1950); Bradley v. State, 227 Ind ..... , 84 N. E. (2d) 580 (1949);
Wilson v. State, 222 Ind. 63, 51 N. E. (2d) 848 (1943); Rhodes v.
State, supra; Sanchez v. State, 199 Ind. 235, 157 N. E. 1 (1927);
Castro v. State, supra.
In the case of Bradley v. State, supra, 84 N. E. (2d) at 582,
this court with its present personnel unanimously held:
The fundamental right of a defendant in a criminal case to have
competent counsel assist him in his defense carries with it as a necessary corollary, the right that such counsel shall have adequate time
in which to prepare the defense. (Emphasis supplied.)

This principle of law was declared by the court when the attorney
was given sixty-five and one-half hours to prepare the defense, and
was deemed a denial of the constitutional right to counsel, and
a denial of due process of law.
Again this proposition was reiterated by the court in Hoy v.
State, 225 Ind. 428, 75 N. E. (2d) 915 (1947), where the trial
court forced appellant to trial on the same day counsel was appointed.
It was there said that adequate time and preparation was "as essential as appointment of counsel." Likewise it was held to be a reversible error to deny a motion for a continuance and force the defendant to trial on a charge of rape, when counsel would only have
approximately one-half day to prepare for trial. Rice v. State, 220
Ind. 523, 44 N. E. (2d) 829 (1942). In Sanchez v. State, supra,
the court emphasized that this right is not defeated merely because
an accused himself employs counsel.
The right to counsel in most states is applied broadly to all
criminal prosecutions, in others it is limited to the more serious
crimes, and in a very limited number, to capital cases. This principle of adequate representation finds support in the reasoning of
an overwhelming array of state decisions whether counsel had been
retained .by the accused or appointed by the court. In Shaffer v.
Territory, 14 Ariz. 329, 127 Pac. 746 (1912), the court said that the
right to have counsel prepare his case for trial is a substantial one,
which cannot be properly infringed by setting the case for trial
three days after accused's arraignment and the employment of counsel. A denial of postponement for twenty hours to subpoena witnesses was held to be an abuse of discretion, though no witnesses
were absent. Sheppard v. State, 165 Ga. 460, 141 S. E. 196 (1928).
An accused placed on trial with only a few minutes to confer with
counsel, did not receive a fair and impartial trial. People v. Hambleton, 399 Ill. 388, 8 N. E. (2d) 293 (1948). The right of a prisoner
to be heard by himself and counsel includes "a co-ordinate right to
sufficient opportunity and time to prepare defense." Carter v. Corn-
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monwealth, 258 Ky. 807, 81 S. W. (2d) 883 (1935). Every man
is presumed innocent, and when accused, entitled to reasonable opportunity to prepare defense. Commonwealth v. O'Keefe, 298 Ga.
169, 148 Atl. 73 (1929). An accused is entitled to consultation with
his attorney, and reasonable time for due preparation of case for
trial, including reasonable opportunity to interview witnesses. Tucker
v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 1038, 167 S. E. 253 (1933).
Thus the cases are in accord that the counsel of the accused
must be given a reasonable time in which to prepare the defense.
Mitchell et al. v. Commonwealth, 225 Ky. 83, 7 S. W. (2d) 823
(1928); State v. Collins, 104 La. 629, 29 So. 180 (1900); Dolan v.
State, 148 Neb. 317, 27 N. W. (2d) 264 (1947); State v. Whitfield,
206 N. C. 696, 175 S. E. 93 (1934); Waters v. State,-.. Okla. Cr.
App ..... 197 P. (2d) 299 (1948).
The decisions of the Supreme Court are not entirely consonant
with this principle. In Canizio v. People of the State of New York,
327 U. S. 82, 66 S. Ct. 452, 90 L. Ed. 545 (1946), the petitioner
did not have counsel during the trial, but he was represented by
an attorney who appeared on his behalf in an effort to secure a low
sentence. The court thought that he "had counsel in ample time
to take advantage of every defense which would have been available
to him originally." See also: Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U. S. 773, 69
S. Ct. 1247, 93 L. Ed. 1686 (1949); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S.
444, 60 S. Ct. 321, 85 L. Ed. 377 (1940). The appointment of
counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial in noncapital cases. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86
L. Ed. 1595 (1942). This Court has in non-capital cases recognized
the constitutional rights of the accused to the assistance of counsel
for his defense where there are special circumstances showing that,
otherwise, the defendant would not enjoy that fair notice and adequate hearing which constitute the foundation of due process of law
in the criminal trial. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 677, 68 S. Ct.
763, 92 L. Ed. 986 (1948). Although the decisions of the Supreme
Court do not establish the inherent right to have counsel appointed
in all criminal prosecutions, the cases lend convincing support as to
the fundamental nature of that right. In the capital punishment
case of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 58, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed.
158 (1932), it was held that placing a defendant on trial with no
counsel until the morning of the trial date was a denial of effective
aid by counsel, and the violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the majority, said:
It is not enough to assume that counsel thus precipitated into the
case thought there was no defense, and exercised their best judgment
in proceeding to trial without preparation. Neither they nor the court
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could say what a prompt and thorough going investigation might disclose as to the facts.

If adequate time for consultation and preparation is essential before trial, it necessarily follows that adequate time must be afforded
and used if counsel is to be in any position to advise whether to
stand trial or enter a plea of guilty. The record of cases indicate
that the appearance of counsel in the present case was rather pro
forma than zealous and active. The defendant was not accorded the
right of counsel in any substantial sense. As the court so logically
said in Commonwealth v. O'Keefe, supra, 148 Ati. at 74:
It is vain to give the accused a day in court, with no opportunity
to prepare for it, or to guarantee him counsel without giving the latter
any opportunity to acquaint himself with the facts or law of the case.

Certainly the prompt disposition of criminal cases is to be commended and encouraged. However, in achieving that end the courts
must not strip the defendant of his right to have sufficient time to
converse with his attorney and to prepare for his defense. To do
that is not to proceed promptly in the calm spirit of regulated justice, but rather to advance with the haste of a mob.

James J. Haranzo

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ExERciSE OF EQUITABLE POWERS OF FEDERAL COURTS IN POLITICAL, QUESTIONS-DISPROPORTIONATE VOTING

SYSTEM OF STATE.-SouthZ et al. v. Peters, 339 U. S. 276, 70 S. Ct.
641 (1950). The complainant sought to enjoin the forthcoming
Congressional election on the grounds that he and fellow citizens
of Fulton County, Georgia, did not have an equal voice in the
election of their representatives for federal offices under the county
unit voting system employed in Georgia. This system gave each
county a fixed number of electoral votes varying between two and
six according to the relative population of the county. The candidate who received a plurality of votes in a particular county received the entire block of electoral votes. The inconsistency of the
system was that the electoral votes allotted to each county were
grossly disproportionate with the relative populations; particularly
the heavily populated counties had far less than their share. A vote
in Fulton County on the average had only one eleventh of the
weight of a vote elsewhere in the state; it had only 1/120th of
the weight of a vote in the most sparsely populated county. The
Supreme Court refused to exercise its equitable powers on the
grounds that it was a political question cognizable only by the political branches of the government.
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The Court in rendering this decision supported its position with
two important cases on the question of whether or not every voter
is entitled to have his vote weigh equally with that of every other
voter. Colegrove et al. v. Green et al, 328 U. S. 549, 66 S. Ct.
1198, 90 L. Ed. 1432 (1946), and Wood v. Broom, 287 U. S. 1,
53 S. Ct. 1, 77 L. Ed. 131 (1932). The latter case involved facts
similar to the instant case, i.e., the distribution of the electoral vote
was so allocated that persons in highly populated districts did not
have an equal voice in the election of their representatives. The
Court dubbed the issue a political question and dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction. The Court there was divided, the dissenting justices being the same as those in the instant case. In the Colegrove case, supra, the Court was presented with an identical question which it resolved in a like manner, by an equally divided Court,
only six justices taking part. The district court had reluctantly followed 'Wood v. Broom, supra, by which it felt itself bound, and
dismissed the case. However, it asked for reversal, 64 F. Supp. 632,
634, in stating:
Our study of the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of
Wood v. Broom ... has resulted in our reaching a conclusion contrary
to that which we would have reached but for that decision. We are
an inferior court. We are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court,
even though we do not agree, with the decision or the reasons which
support it. We have been- unable to distinguish this case and as
members of an inferior court, we must follow it. Only the Supreme
Court can overrule that decision.

The general rule on the lack of jurisdiction in political matters
was aptly expressed by the court in Fletcher v. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41,
37 N. E. 683, 688 (1894), where the court said:
The extraordinary jurisdiction of courts of chancery cannot therefore be invoked to protect the right of' a citizen to vote or be voted
for at an election, . . . nor can it be invoked for the purpose of restraining the holding of an election, or of direction or controlling the
mode in which, or of determining the rules of law in pursuance of
which, an election shall be held. These matters involve in themselves
no property rights, but pertain solely to the political administration
of government.

In accord with this theory several courts have handed down like
decisions: Blackman et al v. Stone, 300 U. S. 641, 57 S. Ct. 514,
81 L. Ed. 856 (1936); Sevilla v. Elizalde, 112 F. (2d) 29 (D. C.
Cir. 1940); Ex parte State ex rel. Tucker, 236 Ala. 284, 181 So.
761 (1938); Patterson et al. v. People ex rel. Parr et al., 23 Colo.
App. 479, 130 Pac. 618 (1913); Printup et al. v. Adkins, 150 Ga.
347, 103 S. E. 843 (1920); State ex rel. Gongwer v. Graves, 90
Ohio St. 311, 107 N. E. 1018 (1914);, Wasson v. Woods, 265 Pa.
442, 109 Ati. 214 (1919); State ex rel. Barber v. Circuit Court of
Marathon County et al., 178 Wis. 468, 190 N. W. 563 (1922). All
of these hold that the right to vote and to have one's vote carry
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weight equal to all other votes is not a right that the judiciary may
protect, but is one that must be protected by the political branches
of the government.
Although no federal courts have been able to find sufficient basis
under the equal protection clause of the Constitution to order that
each man should have an equal voice in the election of government officials, nevertheless the dissenting opinions and the narrow
majority that has decided the cases indicates a definite inclination
toward a liberalization of the justiciability of this type of political
question. The issue upon which this trend turns is the difference
of opinion of the quality of the right to vote.
In Lansdon v. State Board of Canvassers, 18 Idaho 596, 111 Pac.
133, 135 (1910), the court said:
Since the right to vote and hold office is not among the inalienable
rights of which the American people are so jealous, the regulation of
this branch of the rights and privileges of the citizen has been delegated to the political department of the state in every state of the
Union.

The Court seemed to be of the opinion that only the so-called inalienable rights should be protected by the courts; yet the courts
will protect many rights given by the Constitution which are not
inalienable and have never been claimed to be such. A Kentucky
court found itself faced with this question and voiced its opinion
in Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141, 100 S. W. 865, 869 (1907),
that:
Equality of representation is a vital principle of democracy.
proportion as this is denied or withheld, the government becomes
garchical or monarchical. Without equality Republican institutions
impossible. Inequality of representation is a tyranny to which
people worthy of freedom will tamely submit. .

.

In
oliare
no

. It was this kind

of oppression which inspired that great struggle for freedom which
began on Lexington Green in 1775, and ended at Yorktown in 1781.
Equality of representation is the basis of patriotism. No citizen will,
or ought to, love the state which oppresses him; and that citizen is arbitrarily oppressed who is denied equality of representation with every
other citizen of the commonwealth.

Our political system of government is founded on the principle
of limitation effected by the separation of the three branches of the
government, the legislative, the executive and the judicial. To safeguard these powers the courts have taken great caution not to invade
the domain of one or the other of the two branches of goyernment.
At times they have found themselves hard put to draw the dividing
line between judicial rights and political privileges.
Mr. Justice Holmes gave a forcible expression of his opinion of
the problem in Nixon v. Herndon et al., 273 U. S. 536, 540, 47
S. Ct. 446, 71 L. Ed. 759 (1927), where he said:

RECENT DECISIONS
The objection that the subject-matter of the suit is political is little
more than a play upon words. Of course the petition concerns political action but it alleges and seeks to recover for private damage.

The trend of the decisions shows a struggle to overcome the
barricade between the departments of government in order to protect the citizens' right to vote and to have their votes counted
without discount or dilution. Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent
in the instant case aptly describes the county unit system of voting
as the "last loophole" in the Court's decisions that there must be no
discrimination because of race in primary or general elections.
The right to vote is not an absolute right, for it is not accorded
to every individual. Nevertheless when that right is given it must
be given equally to all to insure to each citizen an equal protection
of the law, that law which gives him the right to vote. Who would
contend that the petitioners in the instant case have equal representation in their government when it is conceded that citizens of
one county carry one hundred and twenty times the voting power
per person as those in the petitioners' county, and that on the average the petitioners' votes are worth only one eleventh as much as
those of the majority of citizens outside of their county. If this is
equality what would be disproportion?
Bernard James McGraw

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-HABEAS CORPUS IN EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGs-ScOPE OF INQUIRY.-JOhnsOn v. Matthews, 182 F. (2d)
677 (D. C. Cir. 1950). Lewis Johnson, a fugitive from justice of the
State of Georgia, was apprehended in the District of Columbia and
ordered delivered to an agent of the executive authority of Georgia.
He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for
the District of Columbia and appealed from a judgment dismissing
the writ. Petitioner alleged that he had been the victim of cruel
and inhuman treatment while incarcerated in Georgia, that he would
be unable to secure a fair trial and that his life would be placed
in danger if returned. In affirming the judgment of the lower court,
the circuit court held that it would not, on habeas corpus hearings
to invalidate extradition warrants, hear and pass on evidence concerning the constitutional validity of phases of the penal action in
a demanding state.
The court ruled that habeas corpus was the proper process for
testing the validity of arrest and detention for extradition purposes,
but a petition for a writ tested only the detention in the asylum
state and did not test the constitutional validity of original or prospective incarceration in the demanding state.
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The question presented to the court concerned the exact scope
of the inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings to invalidate extradition warrants: should the hearing be limited to the procedural provisions of the extradition clause of the Federal Constitution, U. S.
CON T. ART. IV, § 2, and the Congressional act which gave it
effect, 18 U. S. C. § 3182 (1946), or should the writ be referred
more directly to the preservation of human rights?
In dismissing the writ the court chose to stay within normal confines established by the decided cases. Traditionally, habeas corpus
to invalidate an extradition warrant tests: (1) correctness of the
requisition papers, (2) identity of the petitioner, (3) whether petitioner is a fugitive from justice of the demanding state, and (4)
whether petitioner was in the demanding state at the time the
alleged crime occurred. See State ex rel. Kollman v. Johnson, 184
Minn. 309, 238 N. W. 490 (1931); Ex parte Birch, .... Old. ....., 209

P. (2d) 510 (1949); State ex rel. Lea et al. v. Brown et al., 166
Tenn. 669, 64 S. W. (2d) 841 (1933); People ex rel. Hollander v.
Britt, 195 Misc. 722, 92 N. Y. S. (2d) 662 (1949); NoTEs, 47
COL. L. R. 470 (1947), 17 TEmP. L. Q. 469 (1943).
In the interests of interstate harmony, the Supreme Court has
been reluctant to pass on evidence of deprivation of constitutional
rights in demanding states when presented with a petition for habeas
corpus. There has been a tendency to regard extradition as almost
automatic when the basic procedural requirements have been met by
the demanding state. In Drew v. Thaw, 235 U. S. 432, 440, 35 S. Ct.
137, 59 L. Ed. 302 (1914), Mr. Justice Holmes stated:
When, as here, the identity of the person, the fact that he is a fu-

gitive from justice, the demand in due form, the indictment by a grand
jury for what it and the governor of New York allege to be a crime
in that state, and the reasonable possibility that it may be such, all
appear, the constitutionally required surrender is not to be interfered
with by the summary process of habeas corpus upon speculations as to
what ought to be the result of a trial in the place where the Constitution provides for its taking place.
-Evidence tending to show that a petitioner suffered deprivation of

constitutional rights in the demanding state has been held inadmissible
in Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192, 27 S. Ct. 111, 51 L. Ed. 148
(1906); Person v. Morrow, 108 F. (2d) 838 (10th Cir. 1940); Cappola v. Platt, 123 Conn. 38, 192 AtI. 156 (1937); Huff v. Ayers, 6

N. J. Super. 380, 71 A. (2d) 392 (1950); Ex parte Colier, 140 N. J.
Eq. 469, 55 A. (2d) 29 (1947).
In Pelley v. Colpoys, 122 F. (2d) 12 (D. C. Cir. 1941), the court
refused to hear evidence of personal animosity existing between the
petitioner and the prosecuting attorney. Petitioner offered to prove
that the animosity was the basis of his conviction and that the prosecuting attorney was now the judge of the court having jurisdiction
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over him if the extradition were successful. In Hale v. Crawford, 65
F. (2d) 739 (1st Cir. 1933), the petitioner sought to invalidate the
extradition warrant by habeas corpus and alleged that Negroes had
been systematically excluded from the grand jury returning the indictment. The court held that testimony concerning such exclusion
was inadmissible and stated that it should properly be heard in a trial
court of first instance.
The petitioner in the instant case specifically alleged cruel and inhuman treatment at the hands of penal authorities in the demanding
state as grounds for release from custody. Michigan and New Jersey
have passed on this phase of the question and have held that such
allegations, plus an expressed fear of mob violence, did not constitute
grounds for issuance of the writ since petitioner failed to sustain his
admittedly heavy burden of proof. In Ex parte Ray, 215 Mich. 156,
183 N. W. 774 (1921) the court said it was not sufficient for petitioner to show statistics concerning lynchings in Georgia and refused to
issue the writ because petitioner could not prove bad faith on the
part of Georgia officials as to his particular case. In passing on the
evidence, the court demonstrated that it might leave the traditional
limits of inquiry in such cases and release the prisoner if he substantiated his charges.
In Ex parte Paramore et al., 95 N. J. Eq.
386, 123 Atl. 246, 247 (1924), the court refused the writ where petitioner based his application on fear of mob violence, and said:
• . . he fears that if he is returned to Georgia he will be lynched;

this fear being based upon alleged threats and demonstrations made
against him by some evil disposed people of the community in which
he formerly lived, and upon mob violence suffered in the past by

persons of the colored race in the state of Georgia. That this plea
does not constitute a legal ground for nullifying the Governor's writ
of extradition is too plain for discussion. To heed the appeal would
be to give the prisoner his absolute freedom-an impossible alternative
to a dismissal of the writ.

Counsel for the petitioner in the instant case cited Johnson v. Dye,
175 F. (2d) 250 (3rd Cir. 1949) where it was held that petitioner for
writ of habeas corpus to defeat extradition should be released from
custody on the grounds that he had proved cruel and barbaric treatment at the hands of jailers in the demanding state. This decision
was later reversed by the Supreme Court, 338 U. S. 864, 70 S. Ct.
146, .. L. Ed... (1949), and the court rightly refused to follow it.
However, the dissenting judge pointed out that the case was reversed without opinion, upon a single reference to Ex parte Hawk,
321 U. S. 114, 64 S. Ct. 448, 88 L. Ed. 572 (1944). Since Ex parte
Hawk did not refer to the question of remedies in a foreign jurisdiction but stated merely that a petitioner should exhaust his remedies
in a state court before applying to a federal court, the dissenting judge
interpreted the reversal of Johnson v. Dye, supra, as being no reversal of that portion of the opinion which would make it possible to
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test the constitutional validity of the acts of a demanding state in its
former or contemplated handling of the petitioner. A review of the
cases cited in Johnson v. Dye, supra, is helpful in tracing the historical origin of the little-used rule that habeas corpus in extradition
proceedings may test the legality of actions of penal officers in demanding states.
Ironically, authority for the rule seems to have been largely manufactured from the wording of cases adhering strictly to the older rule
that the scope of habeas corpus in extradition proceedings should be
limited to the determination of whether a crime had been committed,
whether petitioner was the person so charged, and whether petitioner
was a fugitive from justice of the demanding state. In Commonwealth ex rel. Flower v. Superintendent, 220 Pa. 401, 69 Atl. 916,
919 (1908), the general tenor is that evidence concerning denial of
constitutional rights is inadmissable on habeas corpus hearing to invalidate an extradition warrant, the court stating:
He does not claim that there is any prejudice existing against him
in that state, or that he cannot have a fair and impartial trial in that
jurisdiction for the crime charged there against him.

This language has been construed to mean that if petitioner could
allege and prove that prejudice against him existed in the demanding
state, he should be released from custody.
Further, in Marbles v. Creecy et al., 215 U. S. 63, 69, 30 S. Ct.
32, 54 L. Ed. 92 (1909), the petitioner, a Negro, alleged that there
was danger of lynching if extradition should be ordered, but failed to
prove his allegations. In emphatically denying the writ the court
stated:
It is dear that the executive authority of a state in which an
alleged fugitive may be found, and for whose arrest a demand is made
in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States, need
not be controlled in the discharge of his duty by considerations of
race or color, nor by a mere suggestion-certainly not one unsupported
by proof, as was the case here-that the alleged fugitive will not be
fairly and justly dealt with in the state to which it is sought to remove him, nor be adequately protected, while in the custody of such
state, against the actions of lawless and bad men.

A Pennsylvania court interpreted the foregoing excerpt to imply
that if a petitioner could offer substantial proof that his fears of mob
violence were well grounded, the writ of habeas corpus should be employed to release him from custody. Both Marbles v. Creecy et al.,
supra, and Commonwealth ex rel. Flower v. Superintendent, supra,
were cited as authority for releasing a petitioner in a habeas corpus
proceeding to defeat extradition in Commonwealth ex rel. Mattox v.
Superintendent, 152 Pa. Super. 167, 31 A. (2d) 576 (1943).
The last mentioned case leans heavily on the excerpt from Marbles
et al., supra, and cites Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.
Creecy
v.
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S. 222, 27 S. Ct. 122, 51 L. Ed. 161 (1906), as further authority for
its position. Mattox, a Negro youth, alleged and offered substantial
proof that he would be in grave danger of lynching if sent to the demanding state. The court ruled the evidence sufficient and stated,
Mattox v. Superintendent, supra, 31 A. (2d) at 580:
An ounce of prevention, in this respect, is worth a pound of cure;
and we are of opinion that where the judge granting the writ of habeas
corpus is satisfied by substantial and competent evidence that the feeling against the relator and the attitude of the prosecuting and peace
officers of the demanding state is such as to furnish reasonable grounds
for the belief that he will not receive a fair and impartial trial and
is in grave danger of being lynched or abused by mob action, he
may discharge him from custody and refuse to deliver him over to
the representatives of the demanding state.

Bearing in mind that habeas corpus is the only legal weapon a
fugitive has for personal protection, there is some merit in the argument offered by counsel for petitioner in the instant case that release
from custody should follow a substantial showing that extradition will
result in barbaric treatment of the accused. Whether there should
be a sacrifice of interstate harmony in favor of direct protection of
human rights is a question calling for the expression of differing
philosophical and sociological views of the courts.
The majority based its opinion on the fact that adequate remedies
were available in the state and federal courts of Georgia. Granting
that Georgia courts are completely competent and zealous in the protection of human rights, still the majority holding is based on the
assumption that unusual punishment will positively be held in abeyance until recourse is had to those courts. But, as the dissenting
judge points out, the regularity of official action might well be made
ca rebuttable presumption to be tested in the lights of facts, rather
than by speculation."
There would seem to be no danger of interstate discord when courts
pass on evidence concerning the possibility of lynching and cruel treatment so long as the burden of proof is made to lie heavily on the petitioner. States having humane penal practices should not be averse to
having that system tested by constitutional standards by a sister state.
Probably the court in the case at hand would have been justified in
deeming petitioner's evidence inadequate but the same court should
not effectively close off a fugitive's only means of -escaping unusual
punishment by declaring that such evidence was inadmissible.
Joseph C. Spalding
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT OF WITNESS TO REFUSE TO ANSWER
QUESTIONS CONCERNING HIS MEMSBERSHIP IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

-Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers
of America, Local 735 et al.. ....Ohio App --- 91 N. E. (2d) 431
(1950). Joseph Kres and another were charged with violation of a
restraining order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County,
Ohio, which, inter alia, restricted picketing of the Fawick Airflex Co.,
during a strike at that plant. Kres, a union official, was accused of
inciting a riot among the picketers. Testifying in his own behalf, he
refused on cross-examination to answer the following questions:
"Are you a member of the Communist Party?"
"Have you ever been a delegate as the representative at a Communist Party meeting in the State of Ohio?"

"Did you attend a State convention of the Ohio Communist Party
on April 30, 1944, held at Public Hall?"
The court ruled that the refusals constituted contempt of court.
Kres appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals, which held in the instant
case that the refusal of a witness to answer questions concerning his
alleged affiliation with the Communist Party is punishable as contempt
of court. In his appeal, Kres urged that the court committed prejudical error in permitting "irrelevant and immaterial" questions to be
propounded as to his political affiliations and activities. Judge Doyle,
speaking for the court, stated that questions tending to disclose the
witness's character or affiliations are permissible if they have a "legitimate bearing upon his credit as a witness." He added that the limits
of such cross examination is strictly a matter for the trial court's discretion.
The court continued that, under the circumstances, which indicated an "active, preconceived and planned revolt against law and
order," the inquiry as to appellant's alleged Communist affiliations was
most relevant and material. Taking judicial notice of Communistic
methodology, the court said, 92 N. E. (2d) at 434:
Certainly, in this year of 1950, judges of the courts of America
cannot shut their eyes to things well known to every intelligent layman. . . . the [Communist] party in its struggle for power would
make "merchandise of . . . American principles" and, in the process

of forging ahead, it is well known that the sanctity of the truth and
an oath may be, and is, pushed aside with impunity if warranted by
the occasion.
An earlier reflection of this same view is to be found in the case

of In re MacKay, 71 F. Supp. 397 (N. D. Ind. 1947), in which the
court took notice of the fact that Communism advocates force and
violence and conforms to peaceable democratic processes "for tactical
purposes only."
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In the oft-quoted case of Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.
S. 118, 63 S. Ct. 1333, 87 L. Ed. 1796 (1943), the court reiterated
the judicial cognizance of the villainous aim of Communism, which is
the destruction of existing social conditions through various means, including denial of political rights to all non-Communists or non-proletarians.
From the general tenor of these utterances from the bench, climaxed by the forceful words of Judge Doyle in the instant case, the
trend toward making membership in the Communist Party a ground
for impeachment of a witness becomes discernible. Certainly the
value and reliability of a Communist's testimony seems to be steadily
diminishing. The House Committee on Un-American Affairs recently
expressed the current opinion of many Americans toward Communism.
In H. R. 4581, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. (1947), it said that Communism
is:
... not a political party, but is an international conspiracy and an
anti-religious ideology which advocates and practices deceit, confusion,
subversion, revolution, and the subordination of man to the state,
and which has for its purposes and intentions the overthrow of any
democratic or other form of government by force and violence, if
necessary....

Another timely and significant point is the appellant's second assignment of error in which he protested that the demand that he answer the communist questions violated his constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech, press, assembly, thought and association, and his
privilege against self-incrimination. Referring to this privilege against
self-incrimination, the Ohio Court, in McGorray v. Sutter, 80 Ohio St.
400, 89 N. E. 10 (1909), held it a perversion of the rule to allow a
witness to use this immunity to prevent the discovery of truth or to
protect himself from embarrassment or humiliation.
A very concrete statement of the rule of immunity of witnesses is
laid down by the court in Reg. v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 121 Eng.
Rep. 730, 738 (1861). In that case, Justice Cockburn said:
the danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with
reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of
things---not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, -having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so
improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his
conduct. We think that a merely remote and naked possibility, out of
the ordinary course of the law and such as no reasonable man would
be affected by, should not be suffered to obstruct the administration
of justice ....
it would be to convert a salutary protection into a means
of abuse if it were to be held that a mere imaginary possibility of
danger, however remote and improbable, was sufficient to justify the
withholding of evidence essential to the ends of justice.
...

Justice Marshall, sitting in Aaron Burr's trial, stated that if a reasonable possibility of danger to the witness is apparent to the court,
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then the witness, by virtue of his unique knowledge of the incriminating nature of the answer, must be the sole judge of what his answer
will be. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, No. 14,629e (C. C.
Va. 1807).
Evidence of recent adherence to the same principle as to the
court's power is to be found in such cases as In re Stewart, 121 Wash.
427, 209 Pac. 849 (1922), and In re Berman, 105 Cal. App. 37, 287
Pac. 125 (1930). As recently as 1949, in the case of Apodaca v.
Viramontes, 53 N. M. 513, 212 P. (2d) 425 (1949), the rule was reemphasized when the court held that it is for the trial judge to determine whether a question has a reasonable tendency to incriminate
the witness. Further, the court held that if no such tendency existed, it was the right of the state to compel the witness to answer.
In the instant case, then, the court had the responsibility and the
power to decide whether any direct answer to the questions presented could implicate the appellant.
A much less strenuous approach to the question was taken by
Judge Doyle. He simply pointed out that it is no crime to be a
Communist. Moreover, he said, the witness could not legitimately
complain of any degradation by virtue of his membership in that
"intransigent group" because it was of his own choosing.
Concerning the confusion extant between the commonly recognized
privilege against self-incrimination and a vaguely recognized and presently outmoded privilege against self-degradation, Wigmore, in 3
WIGmoRm, EVIDENCE § 2255 (3rd ed. 1940), points out that:
In English practice the two privileges-concerning infamy and concerning criminality-were never confused . . . In this country, constitutional sanction was given to the latter with practical unanimity;
but there never was any suggestion, in express proposal or in apparent
phrasing, thus to recognize the former; and 'here, as in England, it has
in most jurisdictions come to be ignored, and is replaced by judicial
restrictions of cross examination to character.

Bearing out this contention concerning the non-recognition of the privilege against self-degradation in the United States is the case of Brown
v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 16 S. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819 (1896). There
the court held that a mere tendency of his testimony to degrade the
witness in the public eye did not exempt him from the duty to answer
the questions.
Therefore, since the privilege against self-degradation is not recognized in the United States, appellant's contention with respect to the
self-incrimination privilege should be given short shrift, for three
reasons. In the first place the court disposed of it by application of
the rule propounded in the English case of Reg. v. Boyes, supra. Sec-
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ond, because membership in the Communist Party is not illegal, there
can be no possibility of self-incrimination. Third, if appellant has
confused the privilege against self-incrimination with the alleged privilege against self-degradation, he suffers no wrong if the court refuses
to honor that archaic and currently meaningless privilege.
The appellant's objection concerning his rights of freedom of speech,
assembly, press, etc., are also worthy of consideration here. The court
acknowledges that "liberty of speech and of the press, and liberty of
silence, are within the liberties safeguarded by the clauses of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments." But the court further points out
that the guarantee of personal liberty is not absolute; that it must
give way to the public welfare when something dangerous thereto
seeks to abuse such privilege in order to avoid public scrutiny.
Appropriate to this consideration are the findings of the courts
concerning the recent Congressional investigations of Communism. In
Barsky v. United States, 167 F. (2d) 241 (D. C. Cir. 1948), the court
held that Congress had the power to examine individuals in a manner
which could elicit an admission of Communist beliefs or membership.
The court pointed out that the privilege against self-incrimination is
not involved, since membership in the Communist Party is not illegal.
In 1949, in the case of Lawson v. United States, 176 F. (2d) 49, 52,
(D. C. Cir. 1949), the court said:
. . . the House Committee on Un-American Activities, or a properly
appointed subcommittee thereof, has the power to inquire whether
a witness subpoenaed by it is or is not a member of the Communist
Party or a believer in Communism and that this power carries with it
necessarily the power to effect criminal punishment for failure or refusal to answer that question under 2 U. S. C. A. § 192.

No doubt the communist control bill just passed by Congress over
presidential veto will have considerable bearing on this question. The
measure, entitled the Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 23, 1950), requires that all individuals who
are, or who become, members of a "Communist-action organization"
shall register with the Attorney General as being a member of such
organization. The penalty for failure to so register is a fine of not
more than $10,000, or imprisonment for not more than five years, or
hoth. Admittedly, being a member of a communist organization is
not, as such, a criminal act, and therefore the privilege against selfincrimination cannot be invoked against a question put to a witness
concerning such membership. But under this new law, a communist
may find himself being cross-examined on the witness stand as to his
communist membership when he has failed to register as a communist,
as now required. Consequently his answer would, under this measure,
be incriminating, if truthful. Therefore, could he not now invoke
the privilege?
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Undoubtedly the Commuunist Party will waste no time in seizing
upon any possible constitutional lever to counteract the effect of the
instant case, and to carry on their campaign which is aimed at the
ultimate destruction of the Constitution, that very instrument under
which they now seek refuge.
James Francis O'Rieley

IN EDUCATION AND EQUAL
LAWs.-McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for
Higher Education et al.. ....U. S ..... , 70 S. Ct. 851, 94 L. Ed...
(1950). Plaintiff brought suit to enjoin defendants from refusing to
admit him, a Negro, to the University of Oklahoma for the purpose
of pursuing a postgraduate course in education leading toward a doctor's degree. The district court was of the opinion that if any statute
or law of the State of Oklahoma denies or deprives this plaintiff admission to the University of Oklahoma for the purpose of pursuing the
course of study he seeks, it is unconstitutional and unenforceable. But
the court strongly emphasized the fact that they did not mean the
segregation laws of Oklahoma are incapable of constitutional enforcement. Said the court, in 87 F. Supp. at 528: "We simply hold that
insofar as they are sought to be enforced in this particular case, they
are inoperative." Whereupon McLaurin was admitted to the University and afforded the same educational facilities as other students at a
state university except that he was, in accordance with the state's
segregation laws, assigned to a seat in the classroom in a row specified for colored students, a special table in the library, and a particular
table in the cafeteria. From a judgment of the District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma holding that such conditions did
not deny McLaurin "equal protection of the laws" as guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, in delivering the opinion of the Court,
stated that Oklahoma, in providing graduate education in a state
university, may not segregate Negro students from white students even
though state imposed separation consists only of assignment to a seat
in a row specified for colored students, and to special tables in the
library and school cafeteria.
The specific problem pointed up by the present case is the extent
to which the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
limits the power of a state to distinguish between students of different races in professional and graduate education in a state university.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States states:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SEGREGATION

PROTECTION OF THE
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All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process .of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The primary object of this amendment was to relieve the Negro
race from disabilities which have been said "to be inherent in and inseparable from the African blood." Marshall v. Donavan, 73 Ky.
681, 687 (1874). Also see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.
S. 649, 18 S. Ct. 456, 42 L. Ed. 890 (1898).
Nevertheless, there is veiry definitely one disability they have not
been relieved from-that of segregation in education. This is evidenced by the fact that there are now sixteen states and the District
of Columbia which require the separation of the white and Negro in
education. D. C. CODE § 31-1110 (1940). ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 52,
§ 93 (1940); ARiz. CODE ANN. § 54-416 (1939); ARx. STAT. ANN.
§ 80-509 (1937); DEL. REV. CODE § 2631 (1935); FLA. STAT. §
228.09 (1941); GA. CODE ANN. § 2-6601 (1933) (As amended Ga.
Laws 1945, p. 397); Ky. REv. STAT. § 158.020 (1944); MD. ANN.
CODE GEN. LAWS art. 77, § 111 (1939); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6276
(1942); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10349 (1939); N. C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 115-2 (1943); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 451 (1941)
(now repealed, Laws 1949, p. 607, art. 20, § 9); S. C. CODE ANN.
§ 5377 (1942); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2377 (1934); VA. CODE ANN. §
22-221 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1775 (1949).
The same is
provided for by the Constitutions of Texas and Louisiana: TEx.
CONST. ART. VII, § 7 and LA. CONST. ART. XII, § 1.
The state supreme courts have generally held these statutes to be
constitutional. State ex ret. Farmer v. Board of School Commissioners,
226 Ala. 62, 145 So. 575 (1933); Dameron et at. v. Bayless, 14 Ariz.
180, 126 Pac. 273 (1912); County Court of Union County v. Robinson, 27 Ark. 116 (1871); 'Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874); Grady
v. Board of Education, 149 Ky. 49, 147 S. W. 928 (1912); Williams
et at. v.Zimmerman et al., 172 Md. 563, 192 AUt. 353 (1937); State
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada et at., 342 Mo. 121, 113 S. W. (2d) 783
(1938), rev'd. on other grounds, 305 U. S. 337, 59 S. Ct. 232, 83 L.
Ed. 208; Chrisman et al. v. Mayor, etc., 70 Miss. 477, 12 So. 458
(1893); Johnson v. Board of Edcation, 166 N. C. 468, 82 S. E. 832
(1914); Tucker v. Blease et at., State Board of Education, 97 S. C.
303,,81 S. E. 668 (1914); Martin v. Board of Education et al., 42
W. Va. 514, 26 S. E. 348 (1896).
So have the lower federal courts. Bluford v. Canada, 32 F. Supp.
707 (D. C. Mo. 1940); Wong Him v. Callahan, 119 Fed. 381 (C. C.
N. D. Cal. 1902); United States v. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730 (C. C. S. D.
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Ohio 1882); Bertonneau v. Board of Directors of City Schools et al.,
3 Fed. Cas. 294, No. 1, 361 (C. C. La. 1878).
With respect to the Supreme Court, the direct issue of a state's
right to require separation of the Caucasian and Negro races in the
public schools had never been before the Court. There are several
cases very often cited for that very point but they are not authority
for the proposition. Sweatt v. Painter et al.. .... U. S ...... 70 S. Ct. 848,
94 L. Ed. .

.

. (1950)

(decided the educational opportunities offered

white and Negro law students by state of Texas were not substantially
equal); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada et al., supra, (decided on
the constitutionality of requiring a Negro to attend a school in an
adjacent state); Gong Lum et al. v. Rice et al., 275 U. S. 78, 48
S. Ct. 91, 72 L. Ed. 172 (1927) (decided on the decision rendered
in the Cumming case, supra, but that case is no authority for a state's
right to practice segregation in education); Berea College v. Kentucky,
211 U. S. 45, 29 S. Ct. 33, 53 L. Ed. 81 (1908) (decided merely on
the issue of whether the state statute with respect to segregation in
corporations was constitutional); Cumming v. Board of Education,
175 U. S. 528, 20 S. Ct. 197, 44 L. Ed. 262 (1899) (Mr. Justice Harlan in delivering the opinion of the Court specifically stated that it
was not necessary to consider the question of separate schools for the
white and colored); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138,
41 L. Ed. 256 (1896); (decided on the issue of the constitutionality
of a statute which required the railway to provide separate accommodations and the conductor to assign passengers according to their
race); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. Ed. 547 (1878) (decided
on the issue of segregation on a steamboat being a regulation of interstate commerce). Yet these very cases are generally held to be
authority for the proposition that a state may separate the races in
education providing the facilities are substantially equal.
But when are the separate facilities "substantially equal"? The
earliest recognition of this theory as applied to schools is to be found
in Roberts v. The City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
Later in one of the earliest decisions in federal courts, Bertonneau v.
Board of Directors, supra, at 296, the fundamental rule was stated as
follows:
Any classification which preserves substantially equal school advantages does not impair any rights, and is not prohibited by the constitution of the United States. Equality of rights does not necessarily imply identity of rights.

The requirement of "substantial equality" is met even though there
arises inconvenience to an individual from the location of the Negro
school. Dameron et al v. Bayless, supra; Roberts v. The City of
Boston, supra; Lehew v. Brummel, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S. W. 765
(1891). But if the location is such as to make the school dangerous,
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constitutional

requirements

of equal

facilities

are not satisfied,

Reynolds v. Board of Education, 66 Kan. 672, 72 Pac. 274 (1903);
Lowery v. Board of Graded School Trustees, 140 N. C. 33, 52 S. E.
267 (1905); or in the amount of the appropriations, Chrisman et al. v.
Mayor, etc., supra, ($12,000 for white schools and $3,000 for negro
schools valid), are no ground for complaint if the number of pupils
are in proportion. Also see State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada et al., supra, in which it was held that the requiring of a Negro
to go to school in adjacent state is denial of equal protection of the
laws. In Pearson et al v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590 (1936),
a provision providing for scholarships to Negroes to attend colleges outside the state, mainly for the purpose of professional studies,
does not meet the test of substantial equality. Where white children
spent six years in grade school, three years in junior high and three
years in senior high, but colored children had to spend eight years in
grade school, one year in junior high and three years in senior high,
such treatment did not conform to the test of "substantial equality."
Graham v. Board of Education, 153 Kan. 840, 114 P. (2d) 313
(1941). Establishment of a separate law school for negro students
which did not have an independent faculty or library and lacked accreditation did not meet the test of "substantial equality." Sweatt v.
Painter et al., supra.
However, it is submitted that in the present case, the Supreme

Court has made it more difficult for states maintaining separate school
systems for white and Negro to meet the time honored test of "substantially equal" facilities. True, the present case dealt specifically
with separation in graduate schools, but it is felt this decision will
serve as a forerunner to the elimination of segregation in public
schools. This will result from stricter insistence by the courts to the
adherence of the "substantially equal" theory which the states will
eventually be compelled to meet. This would be proper because racial
segregation in education is contrary to our fundamental positive principles, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the
United States, and tlhe Natural Law which is part of the law of God.
E. Milton Farley, III

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TREATIES-UNITED

NATIONS CHARTER AS

A TREATY AF~cETiNG STATE LAws.-Sei Fujii v. State,.Cal.
App-......
217 P. (2d) 481 (1950). This case concerns itself with an action by a
Japanese immigrant, Sei Fujii, who is ineligible for citizenship under
the naturalization laws, Nationality Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 1140 (1940),
as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 703 (1946), against the State of California.
It was brought to determine whether an escheat had occurred under
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the provisions of the Alien Land Law, CAL. GEN. LAWS act 261, § 7

(1944), as to real property acquired by the plaintiff. From a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County adjudging that
the property conveyed to plaintiff had escheated to the state on the
date of the deed, the plaintiff appealed. The court in the instant case
held that the Charter of the United Nations was a treaty of the
United States, and as such all state laws were subject to it. The
court ruled that since the discriminatory nature of the law was in
open conflict with the provisions of the treaty, particularly Article 17
of the General Assembly's Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which proclaims the right of everyone to own property, the statute
was void.
The fundamental question to be resolved in this case is the determination of whether the United Nations Charter comes within the
meaning of a treaty. "A treaty is primarily an agreement or contract
between two or more nations or sovereigns entered into by agents
appointed for that purpose, and duly sanctioned by the supreme
powers of the respective parties." 52 Am. JuR., Treaties § 3.
The power to make treaties in respect to international problems
is an admitted attribute of sovereignty, i.e., the President and the
Senate. United States v. Curtiss-WrightExport Corp., et at., 299 U. S.
304, 57 S. Ct. 216, 81 L. Ed. 255 (1936). Its sanction is found in
U. S. CONST. ART. VI, § 2, which explicitly states:
All Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitutions or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

In accordance with this constitutional provision a treaty is accorded
the same dignity and force as that of the Constitution. Ware v. Hylton et al., 3 Dall. 199, 1 L. Ed. 568 (U. S. 1796). The courts have
never declared a treaty unconstitutional. Recent decisions seem to
indicate that the judiciary regards the executive as speaking "ex
cathedra" when it decides to speak on the subject of treaties. United
States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 57 S. Ct. 758, 81 L. Ed. 1134 (1937);
United States v. Curtiss-WrightExport Corp. et al., supra. The primitive conditions and circumstances of the eighteenth century dictated
the framers' decision to grant the broad treaty-making powers of the
executive. The distinction between national and international affairs
of the time was not a shadowy line calling for metaphysical niceties.
Wright, The Constitutionality of Treaties, 13 Am. J. INT'L L. 242
(1919). Geography and commerce made them distinct realities. Today, however, the impact of laws and the force of social problems
know no boundaries. They cut through national borders and mix
with those of other nations. A serious difficulty is encountered in
attempting to identify this "hybrid social creature" because of its
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strange resemblance to both a national and an international affair.
The extreme importance of the treaty-making powers is made manifest
when one suddenly realizes that perhaps a "trojan horse" has beqn
within the Constitution throughout these many years.
If the executive possesses the power to make treaties embracing
every subject that is termed "international," he will, in effect, be
making laws for the individuals and the states. Many assert that the
President, under the treaty power, can effectuate his civil rights program and thus avoid any constitutional objection to such legislation.
Holman, Treaty Law Making: A Blank Check for Writing a New
Constitution, 36 A. B. A. J. 707, 788 (1950). The question becomes
one of inquiring whether the executive possesses the power to amend
the Constitution through the treaty device.
All true powers of government reside in the people. See the DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE;

PREAMBLE

To THE CONSTITUTION.

These

powers are transferred to its agents, the three departments of the
government in order to secure the fundamental rights of the people.
It is elementary that an agent cannot possess more power than its
principal. Even more elementary is the inherent disability of the
agent (Federal Government) to give its sub-agent (United Nations)
more power than the agent itself possesses. Manion, Some Legal Aspects of American Sovereignty, 20 NoTRm DAME LAw. 1, 5 (1944).
The treaty-making power extends to all subjects within the international domain. United States v. Pink et al., 315 U. S. 203, 62 S. Ct.
552, 86 L. Ed. 796 (1942); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 44
S. Ct. 515, 68 L. Ed. 1041 (1924); Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U. S. 453,
11 S. Ct. 897, 35 L. Ed. 581 (1891); De Geofroy et al. v. Riggs, 133
U. S. 258, 10 S. Ct. 295, 33 L. Ed. 642 (1890). It is limited to subjects and treaties not inconsistent with our form of government, with
the relation of the states and the United States, or 'with the Constitution. Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211, 21 L. Ed. 523 (U. S. 1872);
Boudinot v. United States, 11 Wall. 616, 20 L. Ed. 227 (U. S. 1871);
Pegano v. Cerri, 93 Ohio St. 345, 112 N. E. 1037 (1916). It is submitted that the powers of the executive under the treaty clause is one
of extension and not one of comprehension. He possesses the legal
capacity in the interests of the nation to name the international subjects to which the provisions of the Constitution shall apply; he possesses no power to change the constitutional provisions to be applied
to these subjects. It is admitted that grave difficulties ensue when
a national subject-matter blends with an international subject-matter.
However, much of the confusion which surrounds this problem would
soon be dispelled if the fundamental principle of our limited government were applied to this problem. If any alleged treaty violates any
individual constitutional right, the subject-matter is distinctly national
in nature, though it may have international consequences.
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In passing upon the constitutionality of any treaty, it is suggested that the court ask three questions: (1) Does this proposed
treaty affect an individual right guaranteed by the Constitution?
(2) Can the national or state government protect this interest without
recourse to foreign governments? (3) Is it unnecessary that this
right be protected for the national welfare, as indicated in Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641 (1920)? If
these questions are all answered in the negative, it is quite clear that
an international subject-matter exists and in this field the government
is sovereign. If, on the other hand, an affirmative answer ensues, it is
evident that a national or domestic subject-matter exists. In this area
the power of judicial review reigns.
When the President and the Senate formally made the United
Nations Charter the law of the land, they did not extend the provisions of the United States Constitution; rather they defined and reformulated the basic constitutional rights in the light of their own
social policy. See Holman, supra. This is not to criticize the rights
conferred by the charter; rather the contention is that this domain
is national in character, exclusively subject to national jurisdiction.
The dominant theme of the charter is its vague language which
leans toward a socialistic conception of the individual to the state, and
its inclusion of aspirations under the guise of fundamental rights.
This charter is not a treaty, a contract between independent nations
concerning international events, but rather a social compact-an international bill of rights-attempting to import a new philosophy of
government into America. See Holman, supra; Simmons, Man's One
Fundamental Right: To Be Let Alone, 36 A. B. A. J. 711 (1950).
Much controversy has been waged over Justice Holmes' decision
in Missouri v. Holland, supra. Previously, a federal migratory bird
act had been declared unconstitutional as an invasion of the reserved
powers of the states, United States v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154 (E. D.
Ark. 1914). A treaty governing the protection of migratory bird life
was ratified by the senate. A second migratory bird act was passed,
practically identical with the first. It was declared valid as a necessary implementation of a valid treaty. Many authorities have expressed deep concern over the possible ensuing consequences of this
decision. Holman, supra, at 709. But in the light of the test proposed above, this decision should give no cause for alarm. No constitutional right of the individual was violated. It was an international
matter which could only be adequately handled by the federal government in the interests of the nation.
In the face of world affairs, the danger of the Constitution being
amended by the executive is becoming more imminent. It may be
pointed out, however, that the presence of Congress acts as a restraint
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upon the powers of the president. This body can abrogate any treaty,
and by failing to appropriate the necessary funds it can frustrate the
purpose of any treaty. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States et al.,
149 U. S. 698, 13 S. Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed. 905 (1893).
Although no case has actually been presented to the courts for determination, it is to be hoped that the courts will recognize their power
to declare any treaty unconstitutional which deals with national problems. Since most treaties require speed of approval to become effective instruments, it is suggested that resort be made to the use of
the declaratory judgment.
The Fujii decision is the first instance of a case decided under a
"presidentially amended constitution." It represents more than a trend;
it is illustrative of the fact that the courts have given judicial notice
to an entirely new body of fundamental principles.
The court held that by reason of U. S. CONST. ART. VI, § 2, the
United Nations Charter became the supreme law of the land. It quoted
Chapter nine, Article 55 of the Charter that "The United Nations shall
promote ...universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion." The court then made reference to the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" which was passed by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, stating that the declaration
emphasized the purpose of the United Nations and its charter. Article
I of the declaration states that "all human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and- rights. They ... should act toward one another
in a spirit of brotherhood." Article II states that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status." Article XVII states that "Everyone has the
right to own property alone as well as in association with others."
In reference to the alleged discrimination practiced upon Mr. Fujii,
the court concludes, 217 P. (2d) at 488:
Clearly such a discrimination against a people of one race is contrary both to the letter and' to the spirit of the charter which, as a
treaty, is paramount to every law of every state in conflict with it.
The Alien Land Law must therefore yield to the treaty as the superior

authority. The restrictions of the statute based on eligibility to citizen-

ship, but which ultimately and actually are referable to race or color,
must be and are therefore declared untenable and unenforceable.

This decision means that the government can make laws in respect to
intrinsically national problems which directly affect the fundamental
rights of the individual. It means that the sovereignty of the people
under our constitutional form of government now resides in the executive and the Senate.
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In the interests of the general welfare the Constitution grants the
control of immigration to Congress, U. S. CoNsT. ART. I, § 8. The
United Nations Charter, in its Chapter 1, subtracts this power from
Congress under the pretense of halting discrimination, vaguely implying that the act is authorized under the nebulous concept of brotherhood.
The president and the Senate are acting within the domain of their
constitutional power when, as treaty-makers, they bargain away the
governmental property rights in order to protect the constitutional
rights of the people. But any attempt by these officers to effectuate
an international agreement involving constitutional rights must fail as
a treaty because it is a transgression upon the exclusive domain of the
people.
Robert J. Affeldt

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WHETHER THE

REMoVAL OF A CONDITION-

ALLY REINSTATED MEMBER OF CIVIL SERVICE INVOLVES CONSTITU-

TIONAL RiGHTs.-Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. (2d) 46 (D. C. Cir.
1950). Appellant, Dorothy Bailey, had been an employee in the federal classified civil service. After having been separated therefrom in
1947, she was conditionally reinstated in 1948. The condition was
that she might be removed by the Civil Service Commission if investigation disclosed certain basis for disqualification. Among such disqualifications was one which arose if reasonable grounds existed for
belief that the person is disloyal to the Federal Government.
This disqualification soon materialized in regard to the appellant
in the form of an interrogatory from and a hearing before a loyalty
board designed to determine the loyalty of Miss Bailey. Specifically,
the questions in the interrogatory and at the hearing probed for
further information concerning the affiliations of the appellant with
the Communist Party or its front organizations. She denied any
affiliation with any phase or undertaking of the Communist Party and
supported her position with affidavits and witnesses. No other witnesses testified. None of the informants, presumably members of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, were revealed. This was ostensibly
for security reasons. When this procedure resulted in a separation and
a three-year ban from civil service, the appellant sought legal relief.
In the district court, she filed an action for a declaratory judgment
and for an order directing her reinstatement in Government service.
The district court upheld the administrative ruling and upon appeal
this court, the circuit court of appeals, affirmed that part of the ruling
referring to separation from Government employ and reversed the
section providing for a three-year ban from federal service. This re-
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versal was based upon the interpretation of the ban as a proscription
and therefore a punishment without a judicial trial under the ruling
in United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 66 S. Ct. 1073, 90 L. Ed.
1252 (1946).
Because the actual ruling in the principal case may be subject to
several interpretations, it is important that the holding of the court
be carefully scrutinized. There is no doubt that the court unequivocally denounced the three-year ban. Confusion may arise however in
regard to the first phase of the ruling when an answer is sought
to the question whether the appellant was considered to be an applicant 'for employment or an employee improperly dismissed. One
writer states that the case held that dismissal plus proscription was
punishment but that "dismissal alone in accordance with the provision
of the loyalty program does not violate the constitutional rights of a
federal employe." (Emphasis supplied.) 38 GEo. L. J. 672. In another review of the case, 36 VA. L. REv. 675, it was stated that the
holding was that:
An administrative board is empowered to bring about the dismissal
of civil service employees for disloyalty without reference to the rights
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, inasmuch as discharge is not a

punishment. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand it is the view of this writer that the case held
that an applicant for employment (rather than an employee) or one
deemed to have the status of such applicant has no constitutional right
to a hearing or a specification of the reasons why he is not appointed.
'To substantiate this view that the court found the appellant to have
the status of an applicant for appointment, resort must be had to the
language of the court. The court found that her placement whether
it be called appointment, reappointment, or reinstatement was as much
a function of the employment authority as is an original appointment.
Desiring to progress deeper into the constitutional question arising out
of contention that the appellant was dismissed, the court said, 182 F.
(2d) at 55:
. . . we must assume that Miss Bailey was in the classified service
without condition at the time of her removal from the rolls and that
she was, therefore, dismissed from employment and not merely denied
appointment; although, as we have indicated, we do not agree with that
view of her status. If her status was merely that of an applicant for
appointment, as we think it was, her non-appointment involved no
procedural constitutional rights.

As stated above the court thoroughly discussed the constitutionality
of the alleged dismissal. Perhaps this was because the court saw the
constitutional issue underlying the applicant-employee status problem
and chose not to base the entire decision upon its interpretation of
the status question. Because of this possibility, a recital of the major
constitutional contentions of the appellant and of the answers of the
court thereto would not be bootless here.
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The three basic contentions of the appellant center upon the
First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments respectively. To the argument
of the appellant that her dismissal since premised upon political
activity violated her rights of free speech and assembly under the
First Amendment, the court replied, 182 F. (2d) at 59:
. . . so far as the Constitution is concerned there is no prohibition
against the dismissal of Government employees because of their political beliefs, activities or affiliations.

The point made under the Fifth Amendment that she was deprived
of property without due process of law was dealt with summarily
by the court when it said that the cases and history emphasize the
fact that Government employ is not property.
The final contention of the appellant was partially based upon
the Sixth Amendment which requires not only confrontation by witnesses but also trial by jury in all criminal prosecutions. She also
bases it upon the presumption that while the Government had the
power to dismiss her, it did not have the power to hurt her. She
contends that though this hearing was not a criminal prosecution
per se, she was charged with disloyalty which she maintains is akin
to treason while dismissal is akin to conviction. This final and perhaps climactic argument was met with the reply of the court that
while the appellant may have been injured, nothing similar to a
criminal prosecution in the legal sense in fact visited her. In order
to weaken the contention of the appellant of the injury to reputation which she suffered, the court applied the rule that an individual
injured by the Government while it is exercising its governmental
power has no redress.
While it was not discussed as a controlling issue by the court,
the question concerning the alleged injury to reputation is a collateral matter which might be studied herein with profit. Essentially
the problem centers around the possible abuse to which the social
and professional reputation of an employee or applicant is threatened
under the loyalty program as administered herein. That the Government as an employer has rights and powers analogous to those of
a private employer is not to be denied. And quite apropos to the
ruling in the principal case are the words of the court in Friedman
v. Sckwellenbach et al., 159 F. (2d) 22, 24 (D. C. Cir. 1946) when
it said:
The United States has the right to employ such persons as it deems
necessary to aid in carrying on the public business. It has the right
to prescribe the qualifications of its employees and to attach conditions
to their employment.
But to portray with vividness the true danger to the reputation of
an employee or applicant who is perhaps actually loyal, it is well
to refer directly to the text of the principal case. The court passed
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over the fact that the loyalty hearing had received much notoriety
with the statement, 182 F. (2d) at 64:
It should be remarked parenthetically that ...

any publicity which

it received was not pursuant to but in flat contradiction of the Executive Order, the Attorney General's instructions, and the Loyalty Board's
rules, all of which forbid publicity.

To cast off the contention of unwarranted injury of the appellant
with the above few words and with no investigation of the reasons
why the orders and instructions prohibiting publicity were not followed reveals a trend not truly in accord with certain policies emphasized in recent cases. Noteworthy is Spanel v. Pegler et al., 160
F. (2d) 619 (7th Cir. 1947), where it was held that the statement
that one is a Communist is libelous per se. Even the charge that
one is an agent and not a member of the Communist party has been
held libelous under New York law. Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
151 F. (2d) 733 (2d Cir. 1945). These cases clearly pronounce
the policy of protecting the reputation of the individual from charges
of affiliation with the Communist party. The instant case therefore
in its disregard for the fact that the proceedings in which appellant
was charged with communistic affiliation were publicized seems to
run counter, in spirit at least, to the libel cases above cited.
In seeking redress for the injury suffered the appellant might
have attempted an action sounding in defamation against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 62 STAT. 933 (1948), 28
U. S. C. § 1346 (b) (Supp. 1948), or against the board members
in their individual capacities for the negligent publication of matter
libelous per se. Either attempt might succumb to the defense of
truth, Sullivan v. Meyer, 141 F. (2d) 21 (D. C. Cir. 1944); the
immunity afforded quasi judicial proceedings, Smith v. O'Brien, 88
F. (2d) 769 (D. C. Cir. 1937); or to the immunity given executive
officers of importance dealing with matters pertinent to their positions,
Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F. (2d) 168 (D. C. Cir. 1927). These patently
reveal the inefficacy of such remedy.
In conclusion it should be emphasized that the ultimate significance of the holding in the principal case lies of course in its determination of the applicant-employe, status problem and also in its
comprehensive presentation of the answers to the constitutional questions involved. It should also be noted that the particular phase
of the decision dealing with the alleged injury to reputation was but
a collateral issue. It is submitted that while the decision is based
upon a sound analysis of the status of the appellant and in addition
resolved any constitutional doubts, the undercurrent of disregard
for the rules designed to properly protect the right to reputation of
the examined employee or applicant is not to be condoned.
Robert A. Stewart
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TAXATION-BENEFICIAL INTERESTS IN TRUSTS TAXABLE UNDER
INTANGiBLE PERSONAL PROPRrY TAxs.-Goodenough v. State et al.,

.... Mich.. 43 N. W. (2d) 235 (1950). Lawrence Holt established
two inter vivos, irrevocable trusts of intangible assets for the benefit
of his children and grandchildren. Under both trusts the trustees
were given full legal title and full management and control of the
principal. The net income was to be distributed annually among
the settlor's children and grandchildren living at the time the trust
was created. Twenty years after the decease of the last of these
beneficiaries, the corpus was to be distributed to grandchildren born
after the establishment of the trust. The trustee was not given any
power to pay out any part of the principal to any beneficiary except
upon the termination of the trust. The intangibles constituting the
corpus of each of the trust estates are of two types: profit-producing,
and nonprofit-producing. Plaintiff, a granddaughter of the settlor
living at the time he established the trusts, is a resident of Michigan. The trusts have their situs in Pennsylvania. Defendants, the
State of Michigan and the Department of Revenue of Michigan,
imposed an intangible property tax against plaintiff as "owner" of
both trusts under the provisions of a statute, MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 7.556(2) (1937), providing for "an annual specific tax on the
privilege of ownership." Plaintiff contested the assessment on the
nonprofit producing assets. Plaintiff, though a beneficiary-and thereby an "owner" by express statutory provision, Micir. STAT. ANN.
§ 7556(1)i (1937), did not have, and never can have, any right of
ownership in the assets of the two trusts; nor can she have any
control over the management of them. Her only power is to bring
suit in event of misfeasance or malfeasance on the part of the trustees. In such action her only recourse would be to the Pennsylvania
courts. The court in a guarded decision declined to pass upon the
constitutionality of the statute, and held only that insofar as the tax
was computed on the basis of plaintiff having a beneficial interest in
the nonprofit producing items of the trusts, such tax was unlawfully
imposed.
The propriety of the decision-forbidding the assessment of a privilege tax where there is no real privilege-can be little doubted. As
stated by the court, 43 N. W. (2d) at 239: "Instead of possessing
a 'privilege' or having a 'beneficial interest' pertinent to the nonprofit producing intangibles, the only result in the instant case is that
plaintiff is assessed an additional tax." However, the question arisesand remains after the decision: what beneficial interest of a cestui
que trust, or what right or power, is properly assessed under an
intangible property tax law?
Intangible property is subject to taxation, Schwab v. Richardson,
263 U. S. 88, 44 S. Ct. 60, 68 L. Ed. 183 (1923), usually at the
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domicile of the owner, Lawrence et al. v. State Tax Commission of
Mississippi, 286 U. S. 276, 52 S. Ct. 556, 76 L. Ed. 1102 (1932).
It is generally recognized that the legislature has power to fix the
situs of intangible personal property, provided that it does not act
arbitrarily, 2 CooLEY oN TAXATION § 444 (4th ed. Nichols 1924).
The property of trust estates generally is assessed against the
trustee as holder of legal title, Johns Hopkins University v. Board of
Com'rs of Montgomery County et al., 185 Md. 614, 45 A. (2d)
747 (1946). The tax is in substance upon the interest of the beneficiary, the trustee being a mere conduit through the medium of
which the property of the beneficiary passes into the treasury. The
tax is assessed in the name of the trustee but is against the beneficiary. Wise v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 693, 95 S. E. 632 (1918);
Selden v. Brooke, 104 Va. 832, 52 S. E. 632 (1906). The trust,
sometimes dealt with as if it had a separate existence, Anderson v.
Wilson et al., 289 U. S. 20, 27, 53 S. Ct. 417, 77 L. Ed. 1004 (1933),
consists of separate interests: the equitable interest of the beneficiary
in the res and the legal interest of the trustee, Brown v. Fletcher,
235 U. S. 589, 35 S. Ct. 154, 59 L. Ed. 374 (1915). In Greenough
et al. v. Tax Assessors et al., 331 U. S. 486, 496, 67 S. Ct. 1400,
91 L. Ed. 1621 (1947), the Court said:
No precedent from this court called to our attention indicates that
the federal Constitution contains provisions that forbid taxation by a
state of intangibles in the hands of a resident testamentary trustee.
Each separate and distinct right or interest in a trust fund may
be appropriately taxed, Wood v. Ford, 148 Fla. 66, 3 So. (2d) 490
(1941); Commonwealth ex rel. Martin v. Sutcliffe, 283 Ky. 274,
140 S. W. (2d) 1028 (1940). The reasoning of the courts was wellstated in Mayor of Baltimore v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 97 Md.
659, 55 Atl. 316, 317 (1903):
The trustee, who holds the title, is the owner in a legal and technical sense, but the cestui que trust is the beneficial and substantial
owner. We do not think the legislature has exceeded its powers over
the subject of taxation, . . . in providing that personal property of the
kind involved in this case [stocks and bonds] shall . . . be treated
as belonging to its substantial owner, and not to its technical holder.
A beneficial interest is said to be something of value, worth, advantage or use to a person, In re Duffy's Estate, 228 Iowa 426, 292 N. W.
165, 168 (1940); it is the entire interest of a beneficiary in a trust,
Papeneau v. Security-First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles, 45 Cal. App.
690, 114 P. (2d) 629 (1941). In Florida, for intangible tax purposes it must be a present vested beneficial interest, Mahan v. Lummus, 160 Fla. 505, 35 So. (2d) 725 (1948); but in New York "any
person who . . . has a right, whether present or future, whether
vested or contingent, to income or principal of the trust fund, has
a beneficial interest in the trust." Schoellkopf et at. v. Marine Trust
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Co. of Buffalo, 267 N. Y. 358, 196 N. E. 288, 290 (1935). Brown
v. Fletcher, supra, has been cited as authority for the proposition
that the beneficiary's equitable interest in the trust is a prqperty
right, although that case dealt with assignment of a beneficiary's
interest, rather than taxation. In Maguire v. Frebrey, 253 V. S. 12,
40 S. Ct. 417, 64 L. Ed. 739 (1920), the leading case on the taxation
of the interests of beneficiaries in trust property, the Court upheld a
tax on income received by a Massachusetts beneficiary from property
held in trust in Pennsylvania. The Court remarked, 253 U. S. at 16:
Such beneficiary has an equitable right, title and interest distinct
from its legal ownership. . . . It is this property right belonging to
the beneficiary, realized in the shape of income, which is the subjectmatter of the tax under the statute of Massachusetts.

In a vigorous stroke against double-taxation the Supreme Court held
in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59,
74 L. Ed. 180 (1929), that Virginia could not levy an ad valorem
property tax against the value of a Maryland trust where the beneficiaries were residents of Virginia. The beneficiaries had no right to
remove the property and no present right to enjoyment; they were
to become entitled to the principal and accumulated income upon
attaining the age of twenty-five. It seems clear that this type of tax
is valid, although Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia has not been
reversed. State Tax Commissioner v. Aldrich et al., 316 U. S. 174, 62
S. Ct. 1008, 86 L. Ed. 1358 (1942); Pearson v. McGraw, 308 U. S.
313, 60 S. Ct. 211, 84 L. Ed. 293 (1939); Curry v. McCanless, 307
U. S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900, 83 L. Ed. 1339 (1939).
The right to tax a resident beneficiary upon his equitable interest
in a foreign trust has been recognized by state courts. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles County, 188 Cal. 491,
205 Pac. 1076 (1922); Sumerall's Committee v. Commonwealth,
162 Ky. 658, 172 S. W. 1057 (1915); Hunt v. Perry, 165 Mass.
287, 43 N. E. 103 (1896); Davis v. Macy, 124 Mass. 193 (1878);
Grand Lodge of Maryland, K. P. v. Mayor of Baltimore et al., 157
Md. 542, 146 At. 744 (1929); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 338 Pa.

9, 12 A. (2d) 444 (1940) aff'd, 312 U. S. 649, 61 S. Ct. 445, 83
L. Ed. 1101 (1941); Ellett v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 136, 110
S. E. 358 (1922). The tax may be assessed to the beneficiary where
the person having control of the property is not vested with the
rights and duties of a trustee in the true sense of the word. In re
Boyd, 138 Iowa 583, 116 N. W. 700 (1908), held that the Iowa
statute, IowA CODE § 428.1 (1946), providing that property held in
trust be listed by the trustee, does not authorize the listing of beneficial interests. In re Cooper's Estate, 229 Iowa 921, 295 N. W. 448
(1940); In re Assessment of Taxes against Van Dyke, 229 Iowa 295,
294 N. W. 319 (1940); Hathaway v. Fish, 13 Allen 267 (Mass.
1866); Swett v. Boston, 18 Pick. 123 (Mass. 1836); Trustees of

RECENT DECISIONS
the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church v. Gratz, 139 Pa.
497, 20 At. 1041 (1891); property is made assessable directly to the
beneficiary in case of a naked or dry trust, Commonwealth v. Souteastern Iron Corp., 142 Va. 107, 128 S. E. 528 (1925).
It is well-settled that the power of appointment is the equivalent
of ownership. "A general power of appointment . . . has hitherto
been regarded by this court as equivalent to ownership of the property
subject to the power." Curry v. McCanless, supra 307 U. S. at 371.
In Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S. 383, 59 S. Ct. 913, 83 L. Ed. 1356
(1939), the decedent created a trust, the income to be paid to his
daughter during her life, then to her children until they reached the
age of twenty-five years when they were to have the corpus. If the
daughter died without issue, the trust estate was to revert to the settlor.
The settlor reserved the right to change the beneficiaries, revoke the
trust or remove the trustees. Such power of disposition, the court
said, 307 U. S. at 386:
. . . is a potential source of wealth and its exercise in the case of
intangibles is the appropriate subject of taxation at the place of the
domicile of the owner of the power. The relinquishment at death, in
consequence of the non-exercise in life, of a power to revoke a trust
created by a decedent, is likewise an appropriate subject of taxation.

Graves v. Elliott, supra, was reaffirmed in Graves v. Schmidlapp,
315 U. S.657, 660, 63 S. Ct. 870, 86 L. Ed. 1097 (1942). It must
be noted however that these cases dealt generally with estate and
inheritance taxes.
The right to receive income is a most valuable and distinctive
attribute of ownership. Under Pennsylvania law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
72, § 3244 (1949), taxation of equitable interests is expressly limited
to cases where the owner is entitled to receive income from the
trust. ". . . if the right to receive income exists, the property is taxable
whether income is received or not." Commonwealth v. Stewart, supra,
12 A. (2d) at 451. But in Ohio if the trustee is authorized, but not
required, to make a distribution of income from the trust, when such
distribution is made the beneficiary has a taxable interest and an intangible property tax may be levied, Oro GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5328-1,
5370 (1938); Harker v. Evatt, 140 Ohio St. 354, 44 N. E. (2d) 355
(1942). In Mahan v. Lummus, supra, the trustee had absolute management and control of an irrevocable trust. Income of the trust was
to be paid to the beneficiary during her life for her maintenance and
support but for no other purpose; she had no power of appointment.
The court held that this naked right to receive income was not a taxable beneficial interest. In Commonwealth ex rel. Martin v. Sutcliffe,
supra, 140 S.W. (2d) at 1032, the court stated that ". . . the right
to receive income from intangibles is more than potential wealth, it is
real wealth and is likewise taxable." County Board of Tax Sup'r v.
Helm, 297 Ky. 803, 181 S.W. (2d) 452 (1944).
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A beneficiary having the right to income for life and the power
to devise the trust was held to be the real beneficial owner and
assessable for intangible property tax in Florida, Wood v. Ford, 148
Fla. 66, 3 So. (2d) 490 (1941). Where the beneficiary would receive
a share of the income from a trust only if living at the time of
distribution, he had not a sufficient beneficial interest to be assessed
for the tax, since he had not a present, vested beneficial interest,
Owens v. Fosdick, 153 Fla. 17, 13 So. (2d) 700 (1943). In the
Mahan case, supra, where the beneficiary had a right to a certain
income but no power of appointment, a provision in the trust agreement whereby the beneficiary was to receive emergency payments
from the trust in case of incapacitation, the beneficial interest was
not considered to have been enlarged and no tax was levied. In
City of St. Albans v. Avery, 95 Vt. 249, 114 Atl. 31 (1921) the
beneficiaries had the power to absolutely control the character of the
securities comprising the fund and the power to terminate the trust
at will. Their interest was held to be property and therefore subject
to taxation. Fidelity & Columbus Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S.
54, 38 S. Ct. 40, 62 L. Ed. 145 (1917); Hunt v. Perry, supra;
Brooklyn Trust et al. v. Booker, 122 Va. 680, 95 S. E. 664 (1918).
The principal case points up the confusion existing in the taxation of beneficial interests under intangible property tax statutes.
Undoubtedly a beneficial interest is a type of property, and the owner
thereof is a type of owner against whom a tax may be levied. However, the question remains: what is a beneficial interest that should,
in justice to the owner, be subject to a tax? To levy an income tax
against those who have no income is absurd; likewise illogical is
the levying of a property or privilege tax against one who has no
property or privilege. In the instant case the plaintiff received neither
income from the nonprofit producing items in the corpus, nor owned
any real beneficial interest in the trust corpus which could never
benefit her, or over which she could exercise any control. Thus it is
submitted that the intangibles tax could not be assessed against her
as attempted. So it was held.
Robert A. Layden

TAXATION - FEDERAL
EXPENSES-CoMISSIONS

INCOME

TAXES - DEDUCTIBLE BUSINESS
OF MANUFACTURER'S AGENT ("FIVE PER

CENTER") TO SECURE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS.-The Aetna-Standard

Engineering Co., 15 T. C. No. 42 (Sept. 25, 1950), P-H 1950 TC
SERv. f 15.42 (1950). Petitioner, a manufacturer, employed Milburn
& Brady, Inc., to act as petitioner's agent to aid in securing war
contracts, for which Milburn & Brady, Inc. was to receive a five
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per cent commission for any busiess it might obtain. The agent
secured two contracts for the petitioner te produce 37mm. gun carriages, the contracts totaling $5,005,189.91, for which the petitioner
paid commissions of $59,496.24. Petitioner seeks to deduct this
amount as an ordinary and necessary business expense under Section
23(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.
In obtaining the contracts Milburn & Brady, Inc. performed
many valuable services for petitioner. Possibly the most important
of these was the action taken when it was found that two other
manufacturers had underbid the petitioner on a competitive bid. The
agent submitted information to the government officials that the
lowest bidder was incapable of performing the contract; it also contended that the other lower bidder was an Atlantic Seaboard producer who was much more vulnerable to enemy action than the
petitioner's plant which was located at Youngstown, Ohio, so that
petitioner should be given at least part of the contract. Similarly
after the contracts had been let, the agent continued to perform many
services for the petitioner.
The court found that in all the services performed by Milburn &
Brady, Inc. there was no evidence that it had used improper methods
or had exerted any personal influence upon government officials. Further, that the services rendered for the petitioner corresponded to
those performed by other manufacturers' agents for similar remuneration, which had been reduced in the instant case from five per cent
to somewhat less than one and a half per cent of the gross contract
price.
The court held that the commissions paid by the petitioner to its
agent were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses
under Section 23(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.
This decision falls cleanly within a class of controversies involving
the deductibility of commissions paid to manufacturer's agents for
procuring governmental contracts. The deductibility of these commissions is assailed on two grounds: (1) that they are extraordinary
expenses incurred in activities contrary to public policy, and thus
should not be deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses
within the meaning of the statute; and, (2) that they are "sums of
money expended for lobbying purposes, . . . including advertising
other than trade advertising . . . " and are expressly non-deductible
as per U. S. TREAS. RGo. 111, §§ 29.23(o)-i and 29.23(q)-i (1950).
Harden Mortgage & Loan Co., 11 P-H BTA MEm. DEc. ff42,431
(1942), aff'd, 137 F. (2d) 282 (10th Cir. 1943). The first ground
is the one of primary importance.
The test promulgated under the decisions is that commissions
paid to manufacturer's agents will not be allowed to be deducted
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when the agent has been employed to, or has in fact exerted personal influence, Easton Tractor & Equipment Co. et al., 35 B. T. A. 189
(1936); New Orleans Tractor Co., 35 B. T. A. 218 (1936), or
political influence, T. G. Nicholson, 38 B. T. A. 190 (1938); Messenger Publishing Co., 16 P-H TC MEM. DEC. 147,241 (1947),
af'd mem., 168 F. (2d) 903 (3rd Cir. 1948). That there is no
essential difference between personal and political influence is clearly
recognized by the courts. See Harden Mortgage & Loan Co., supra.
The reason given for denying deductibility, New Orleans Tractor Co.,
supra at 220, is that the
. . .agreement .. . was void and unenforceable as contrary to public
policy and, further, that commissions paid pursuant to such an agreement did not constitute such an ordinary and necessary business
expense as was contemplated by the applicable revenue act.

Deductibility is generally denied when the payments are made to
officeholders directly, T. G. Nicholson, supra; Harden Mortgage &
Loan Co., supra. But cf. Alexandria Gravel Co. v. Commissioner,
95 F. (2d) 615 (5th Cir'. 1938), reversing, 35 B. T. A. 323 (1937),
or indirectly, Harden Mortgage & Loan Co, supra. Likewise deductibility isdenied when payments are made to political figures who
are not officeholders where the hiring appears to be under circumstances that indicate that the use of personal or political influence
is anticipated, Easton Tractor & Equipment Co., supra, and New
Orleans Tractor Co., supra (agent was "close to the administration");
Messenger Publishing Co., supra ("political leader"); Harden Mortgage & Loan Co., supra ("powerful influence"; also members of the
agent-partnership were state officials); Blake B. Rugel, 10 P-H BTA
MEM. DEC. ff 41,040 (1941) (close friend and donator to T. J.
Pendergast, machine politician). This rule applies even though there
is no evidence of "improper acts" by the agent, as long as the
payor of the commission could presume that some of the money
would go to persons prominent in politics. Harden Mortgage &
Loan Co., supra.
There are a few cases which allow commissions paid to a manufacturer's representative to be deducted. In Estate of Joseph H.
Scobell et al., 47 B. T. A. 971 (1942), fees paid to a lawyer to
represent the taxpayer before the Ohio Board of Liquor Control
were allowed to be deducted. Although the counsel engaged had been
formerly an Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, he had left state
employment and was in private practice. The Board of Tax Appeals
found no political influence exercised.
Similarly a deduction for a ten per cent commission was allowed
in Spillman Engineering Corp., 15 P-H TC MEM. DEC. 146,258
(1946). Here the" court found that there was no evidence that the
agent had been hired upon a representation of personal influence nor
that any such influence had in fact been exerted. It rejected, as not
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founded on authority, the Commissioner's contention that as the bids
were competitive there was no need to pay a commission to an agent
to secure the contracts, and thus the commission was an extraordinary expense.
The Alexandria Gravel Co. case, supra, is cited in the instant
decision as involving the same situation. The Alexandria case was
a two-to-one decision, open to some doubt on the facts. The Board
of Tax Appeals denied the ten per cent commission paid to one
Dore, a Louisiana State Senator. It found that the taxpayer knew
at the time he engaged Dore that Dore "was 'friendly with the administration,' had 'good personal contacts,' and was a 'good mixer.'"
35 B. T. A. at 324. Evidence also showed that Dore was able to
obtain prompt issuance of warrants by the state auditor's office as
a "special favor," and that the competitive bids were awarded only
"to a great extent" to the lowest bidder. Upon these findings the
Board concluded that the commissions paid to Dore were for his
"personal influence" and were non-deductible.
The circuit court of appeals reversed, 95 F. (2d) 615 (5th Cir.
1938), interpreting the facts to indicate that Dore was not hired
to exert any personal influence, and that he had not in fact been
shown to have exerted any. It dismissed the securing of prompt
issuance of warrants as a "special favor" as non-prejudicial to the
public, and characterized the bids as "competitive" where little effective influence could be exerted, rather than competitive "to a great
extent" as found by the Board. The dissenting judge questioned the
majority's opinion, stating that the fact that the bids were deemed
to be competitive "would seem to support, rather than refute, the
inference of the Board that payment of the commission in question
was unnecessary and extraordinary." Supra at 616-7. This decision
can be interpreted to mean that there is a presumption of a lack
of political or personal influence, at least when the contracts are
secured upon competitive or semi-competitive bids, and that it is
upon the government to rebut this presumption.
Analyzing the cases several rules appear: (1) that commissions
paid to manufacturer's agents will not be deductible if the agent is
hired to exert personal and/or political influence on government officials; (2) that the courts are prone (with the exception of the
Alexandria case) to find influence if the agent is an officeholder or
has substantial political influence; (3) that if the contract is secured
on a competitive or semi-competitive bid, the inference is that effective influence could not have been exerted; and, (4) that some sort
of valuable services must be performed by the agent. This lat rule
is indicated by the decisions in Estate of Joseph H. Scobell et al.,
supra, and Spillman Engineering Corp., supra, as well as in the instant case.
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The principal case appears to be a sound decision on its particular
facts in that the manufacturer's agent was not shown to have exercised any personal or political influence, especially in view of the fact
that the contracts were obtained primarily on the basis of competitive
bids. It also emphasized the rule that valuable services must be performed by the agent.
However, it leaves at least one question unanswered. The contracts here were not secured according to absolute competitive bids
as the petitioner did not submit the lowest bid. The obtaining of the
contract under this circumstance by the agent indicates the exercise
of some influence. Whether this exercise was impersonal and nonpolitical the evidence does not disclose, and the court does not
explicitly consider the point. It must be conceded that the argument
expounded by the agent to the government officials-that part of the
contract should be let to an inland manufacturer-seems to be valid
as impersonal and non-political.
The decision also creates a dangerous implication. First it does
not attempt to draw any line between political and non-political
influence. It follows the Alexandria case expressly stating it to
involve the same situation without any explanation or distinguishment, when the facts of the Alexandria case show a definite tainting
of political influence not explicitly present in the instant case; this
is coupled with disregard of an express examination of the finding of
fact that both Milburn and Brady had personal connections with
various government officials including the former chief of the Naval
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. All of this strengthens the implied
rule of the Alexandria case-i.e., that there is a presumption of a lack
of political influence which must be rebutted by the government.
This is against the weight of authority of the other cases, and places
the Commissioner in the unfavorable position indeed of having to
produce evidence that is extremely difficult to obtain, especially in
these days when Washington and the state capitals are infested with
the so-called five per centers.
Mark Harry Berens

TORTs-APPLICATION OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE TO
PONDS AND POOLs.-Plotzki v. Standard Oil Company of Indiana,.
Ind. App ..... 92 N. E. (2d) 632 (1950). The Standard Oil Co. of
Indiana, in the spring of 1944, had a large excavation made on its
premises in a residential area of the city of Hammond, Indiana.
The excavation was located about fifty yards from the street, and
was clearly visible from the sidewalk. The bottom of the excavation
was very uneven, ranging from a foot or so to eight feet in depth.
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The excavation became filled with water and was frequented by large
numbers of children who used it as a swimming hole. The water
was not clear and the drop-offs were obscured by the murkiness of
the water. No fence was maintained about the premises and no
warning signs were posted.
Donald Plotzki, plaintiff's eleven year old son, went to the pool
and while wading therein stepped into one of the drop-offs and was
drowned. The complainant alleged that the boy had no knowledge
of the deep water caused by the drop-offs. The plaintiff, who is the
mother of the deceased infant, seeks.to recover for his death on the
theory that defendant maintained an attractive nuisance which was
the cause of the boy's death. The lower court sustained defendant's
demurrer on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause
of action under the doctrine. The Supreme Court of Indiana, with
strong dissent, affirmed the judgment.
The weight of authority in the United States is to the effect that
the attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply to ponds, pools,
lakes, streams or other bodies of water-at least where there is no
unusual danger. Blough v. Chicago G. W. R. R. Co. et al., 189
Iowa 1256, 179 N. W. 840 (1920). Also see Note, 36 A. L. R. 224
(1925) and cases cited therein.
Various reasons have been set forth for the refusals of the courts
to extend the doctrine to such conditions. The perils embodied in
ponds, pools, lakes, streams and other waters are deemed to be obvious to children. Troglia v. Butte Superior Mining Cotnpany, 270
F. 75 (9th Cir. 1921). The element of hidden or concealed danger
such as will probably result in injury to children is lacking. Considering the large number of children who swim in ponds every day
of the year, the number of fatal or serious accidents is comparatively small. Sullivan v. Huidekoper, 27 App. D. C. 154, 5 L. R. A.
N. S. 263 (1906). In light of the usefulness of ponds and pools of
water it would result in the imposition of an oppressive burden upon
landowners to hold them responsible for children who use their ponds
for swimming. Common sense tells us that it is a relative impossibility to keep boys out of swimming holes and ponds. Sullivan v.
Huidekoper, supra. There is nothing more attractive or dangerous
about an artificially created pond than there is in natural ponds or
streams of water. Blough v. Chicago G. W. R. R. Co. et al., supra.
It would represent an impossible task to invent and erect around
every pond and pool in the United States at a reasonable cost a fence
which could be guaranteed to keep boys out. Emond et al. v. Kimberly-Clark Co., 159 Wis. 83, 149 N. W. 760 (1914). Boys are
adventuresome and athletic by nature, continually occupied in relatively dangerous activities. If a landowner on whose property there
is a pond can be held liable for a child who drowns in it so might
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every riparian owner who leaves the river banks exposed. Robbins v.
Omaha, 100 Neb. 439, 160 N. W. 749 (1916). The danger of being
drowned in a pond or pool isnot concealed or disguised even to an
infant. Such dangers are in the open, easily seen and do not constitute a trap or pitfall. Eades v. American Cast-Iron Pipe Co., 208
Ala. 556, 94 So. 593 (1922). There is always the danger of drowning in the waters of streams and pools, and children are presumed
to have been instructed early against such dangers and should be
sufficiently acquainted with them. Anderson v. Reith Riley Construction Co., 112 Ind. App. 170, 44 N. E. (2d) 184 (1942).
The problem facing the court was the formulation of the policy
of the Indiana courts on the subject, with a view to the relative
policy considerations involved.
The position of the Indiana Supreme Court in regard to the extension of the attractive nuisance doctrine to cases involving ponds
and pools was first indicated in 1886 in dictum only. In a case involving a negligence action for maintaining an unguarded foundation
pit in the bed of a stream adjacent to a public street, it was stated
that anything done immediately adjacent to a public street such as
would probably attract children into danger must be suitably guarded.
Indianapolis v. Emmelman, 108 Ind. 530, 9 N. E. 155 (1886). This
dictum was followed and applied as the law of the state in Indianapolis v. Williams, 58 Ind. App. 447, 108 N. E. 387 (1914).
By 1937, however, the Indiana Supreme Court in dictum, without
any reference to Indianapolis v. Williams, supra, modified the rule
to the extent of declaring the "turntable" or attractive nuisance doctrine to be inapplicable to swimming pools in parks, whether they
were artificially constructed, or merely natural bodies of water improved in their bathing facilities. Such waters were deemed obvious
to children to be sources of danger. Evansville v. Blue, 212 Ind. 130,
8 N. E. (2d) 224 (1937).
A further modification of the rule was made in 1942, by dictum, in
a case involving a sand pit, where an analogy was drawn between an
open sand pit and an unguarded pool of water to the effect that both
were common to nature and contained nothing of danger that was not
obvious. Children were presumed to have been warned at an early
age concerning the dangerous nature of ponds and pools whose
depths might be uncertain. Anderson v. Reith Riley Construction
Co., supra.
Although severely criticized by Justice Emmert in his dissenting
opinion, this trend toward a limitation of the application of the
attractive nuisance, doctrine is as much in keeping with the policy
of Indiana courts as those of the majority of the states. The law
is reluctant to impose restraint upon a landowner's use of his property,
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even where such a use is injurious to those outside his boundaries.
The reluctance is even more pronounced where the owner is to be
hampered merely for the protection of those who trespass upon his
land, even though they be children of tender years. Holstine v.
Director General of Railroads, 77 Ind. App. 582, 134 N. E. 303
(1922).
That such a trend represents an intelligent and realistic approach
to the problems- involved in applying the attractive nuisance doctrine
is indicated by a careful analysis of the alternative measures suggested by Justice Gilkinson in his dissenting opinion, 92 N. E. (2d)

at 645:
Under the conditions shown by the complaint appellee was charged
with the duty of (a) fencing the pool, posting notices forbidding trespassing or suggesting danger, (b) removing the attraction, (c) keeping children out of the pool or (d) taking reasonable precautions for
their safety.

To a suggestion similar to (a) above, Justice Vinzi, in writing
the majority opinion in Emond v. Kimberly-Clark Co., supra, 149
N. W. at 761, said:
The world cannot be made danger-proof--especially to children. To
require all natural or artificial streams or ponds so located as to endanger the safety of children to be fenced or guarded would in the
ordinary settled community practically include all streams and ponds,
be they in public parks or upon private soil, for children are self-constituted licensees, if not trespassers, everywhere. And to construct a
boy-proof fence at a reasonable cost would tax the inventive genius
of an Edison.

The majority opinion expressed in Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal.
345, 47 Pac. 113, 114 (1896), suggests that the alternative suggested
in (a), of posting danger signs, would be merely tautological.
Such a body of water may be found in or close to nearly every
city or town in the land; the danger of drowning in it is apparent
open danger, the knowledge of which is common to all; . . .

The alternative recommended in (b), involving draining of the
excavation, seems especially well met in Stendal v. Boyd, 73 Minn.
53, 75 N. W. 735 (1898).
If 'he [property owner] must fence in his stone quarry after it fills
with water, so that children cannot reach it,-a well-nigh impossible
task,-why should he not be required to do it -before, [or after the
water has been removed] for a stone quarry, with its steep and irregular sides, might well be an attractive and dangerous place to children?
It would seem that there was no middle ground, and that the doctrine
*

.

. ought to be limited to cases of attractive and dangerous machinery.

Such an absolute prohibition upon a property owner as suggested
in (c) is unknown in Kentucky, whose Court of Appeals in McMillin's Adm'r v. Bourbon Stock-Yards Co., 179 Ky. 140, 200 S. W.
328, 329 (1918), said of itself:
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We . . . have extended what is known as the attractive nuisance
doctrine possibly farther than, and certainly as far as, any other court
whose opinions have come under our observation; ...
But this duty [to safeguard premises] does not go to the extent
of making the owner an insurer of the safety of trespassing children.

The precise nature of the "reasonable precautions" suggested in
(d) is not obvious from the opinion as stated. Such measures as
refilling the excavation and again reopening it as the construction
work progressed, maintaining a life-guard, keeping servants on the
look-out, etc., seem to fall within the area excluded as unreasonable
in Chicago B. & Q. R. R. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 91 N. W.
880, 882 (1902).
But it must be kept in mind that it [the duty to safeguard infants]
requires nothing of the owner that a man of ordinary care and prudence would not do of his own volition, under like circumstances.
Such a man would not willingly take up unreasonable burdens, nor
vex himself with intolerable restrictions.

Whether, as suggested by dissenting Justice Emmert in his dissenting opinion, Indiana will revert to the rule of Indianapolis v.
Williams, supra, remains to be seen. The present tendency toward
a limitation of the attractive nuisance doctrine, however, would seem
to suggest that his prediction was not well founded.
Joseph T. Helling
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ENTIRE BENEFICIAL INTEREST IS VESTEa-Speth v. Speth et al.,
, 74 A. (2d) 344 (1950). Testatrix devised and be....
N. J .....
queathed her residuary estate to the Plainfield Trust Company and
her brother James Speth, in trust. The trustees were to invest and
reinvest, to collect and receive the income, and to pay over the
entire income to her brother James Speth for a period of ten years,
and at the end of the ten-year period to pay over the corpus and
principal to James Speth. Testatrix further directed the trustees
that should some unusual circumstances arise they were to apply, in
addition to the income, some portion of the principal for the benefit
of James Speth. The beneficiary sought to compel premature termination contending that since he was the sole beneficiary-in whom
the entire beneficial interest was vested, he was entitled to immediate termination despite the provisions of the trust to the contrary.
The court held that the intention of the testatrix, since it violated
no rule of law or public policy, was to be given effect, and accordingly refused to decree termination.
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When, as in the instant case, a trust provides that the income
is to be paid to the beneficiary or accumulated for him for a certain
number of years or until the beneficiary reaches a certain age and
at that time the principal is to be paid to him, or if he dies before
reaching such age or such period has elapsed, to his estate, or to
whomever he designates in his will, the entire beneficial interest of
the trust is vested in him. The problem arises whether he can
compel termination before the time fixed by the terms of the vested
trust, contrary to the intention of the settlor.
In England when the entire beneficial interest is vested in a
single beneficiary, such beneficiary, if sui juris, is entitled to termination at any time notwithstanding contrary provisions of the
trust. The leading case of Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, 49 Eng.
Rep. 282 (1841), involved a trust under which the principal and
accumulated income were to be paid to the sole beneficiary at the
age of twenty-five. At the age of twenty-qne he demanded payment, and his request was granted by the court over the opposition
of the trustee. The Master of the Rolls (Lord Langdale) stated,
49 Eng. Rep. at 282:
...where a legacy is directed to accumulate for a certain period, or
where the payment is postponed, the legatee, if he has absolute indefeasible interest [in the legacy], is not bound to wait until the
expiration of that period, but may require payment the moment he is
competent to give a valid discharge.

This view seems to have been adopted without much consideration,
as pointed out by Lord Herschell in Warton v. Masterson, L. R.
[1895] A. C. 186, 193, his Lordship stated:
The point seems, in the first instance, to have been rather assumed
than decided. . . . It is needless to inquire whether the courts might
have given effect to the intention of the testator. . . . The doctrine

has been so long settled and so often recognised that it would not be
proper now to question it.

The rule has been explained upon the ground that the postponement
of enjoyment is inconsistent with or repugnant to the absolute interest granted. Gosling v. Gosling, Johns. V. C. 265, 70 Eng. Rep. 423
(1859); Curtis v. Lukin, 5 Beav. 147, 49 Eng. Rep. 533 (1842).
In the United States the courts have generally reached the opposite result. According to the view prevailing in the majority of
states, the expressed intent of the settlor will be respected by the
court against an attempt of the beneficiary to secure premature termination. Shelton et al. v. King et al., 229 U. S. 90, 33 S. Ct. 686,
57 L. Ed. 1086 (1913); DeLadson v. Crawford, 93 Conn. 402, 106
Atl. 326 (1919); Claflin v. Claflin et al., 149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E.
454 (1889); First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Hamburger et al., 185 Wis.
270, 201 N. W. 267 (1924); RESTATEMENT, TRiUSTS § 337 (Supp.
1948). The leading American case on the question is Claflin v.
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Claflin, supra. In that case a testator left property in trust for his
son, directing the trustee to pay the son ten thousand dollars at
the age of twenty-one, ten thousand dollars at the age of twenty-five,
and the balance at the age of thirty. After the beneficiary reached
the age of twenty-one and received the first payment, but before he
reached the age of twenty-five, he brought suit to compel the trustee
to pay him the remainder of the trust fund. The beneficiary contended that since he was the sole beneficiary of the trust his interest
in the trust fund was vested and absolute, and the provision in the
will postponing the payment of the money beyond the time he was
twenty-one was void. The court held that he was not entitled to
termination of the trust. In the opinion, 20 N. E. at 456, Field, J.,
said:
In the case at bar nothing has happened which the testator did not
anticipate, and for which he has not made provision. It is plainly his
will that neither the income nor any part of the principal should now
be paid to the plaintiff. It is true the plaintiff's interest is alienable by
him, and can be taken by his creditors to pay his debts, but it does
not follow because the testator has not imposed all possible restrictions [i.e., a spendthrift trust] that the restrictions which he has imposed shall not be carried into effect. .

.

. We are unable to see that

the directions of the testator to the trustees to pay the money to the
plaintiff when -he reached the age of 25 and 30 years and not before
are against public policy, or are so far inconsistent with the rights of
property given to the plaintiff, that they should not be carried into
effect. It cannot be said that these restrictions upon the plaintiff's possession and control of the property are altogether useless, for there is
not the same danger that he will spend the property while it is in the
hands of the trustees as there would he if it were in his own.

Under the Claflin doctrine, the mere fact that enjoyment of the
principal is postponed does not prevent the beneficiary from transferring his interest in the principal or income. Stier v. Nashville
Trust Co., 158 Fed. 601 (6th Cir. 1908); DeLadson v. Crawford,
supra; Claffin v. Claflin, supra. However, if the beneficiary does
transfer his whole interest under the trust his transferee cannot
compel premature termination, otherwise the provision for postponement would be practically nugatory, since the beneficiary could force
premature termination by mere transfer. Stier v. Nashville Trust
Co., supra; DeLadson v. Crawford, supra; First Wisconsin Trust
Co., v. Hamburger, supra; RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS § 337, comments
(j) and (k) (Supp. 1948).
It would seem clear that even under the American view the
duration of postponement must be limited. A provision making a
trust indestructible or postponing enjoyment of the principal for an
unreasonable length of time does not violate the Rule against Perpetuities; that rule being concerned only with the time within which
interests must vest; but when once vested, as in the Claflin situation, the Rule against Perpetuities is not concerned. See GRAY, THE
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RULE AGAmNST PERPETUITIES § 121.5 (4th ed. 1942) for a detailed
analysis. The question does not seem to have been directly considered by the courts, but it has been suggested that trusts which
are by their terms to continue for a period longer than allowed by
the Rule against Perpetuities are void, or at least terminable at the
option of the beneficiary, not by virtue of the Rule against Perpetuities, but by analogy, under a suggested rule which would adopt
the same period. KALES, ESTATES FUTURE INTERESTS 737 (2d ed.
1920); Cleary, Indestructible Testamentary Trusts, 43 YALE L. J.
393, 397 (1934). In the instant case the court said by way of
dictum that a similar rule might well be applied, but since a period
of ten years "does not materially offend public welfare" they did not
pursue the matter further.
The American cases following Claflin v. Claflin, supra, stress the
notion that the owner of property can do as he likes with it, cujus
est dare est disponere; that it is the privilege of the donor to qualify
his gift in any manner he pleases so long as the qualifications do not
violate any positive rule of law or are not contrary to public policy.
On the other hand, the same maxim can be used to support the
English rule. When the entire beneficial interest is vested in the
cestui, he is in substance the real owner, and, if under no disability,
should not be restrained in the use and disposition of property in
which no one but himself has any interest. If the question is to be
decided simply on authority, the English courts have long since
settled the law and American courts have usually paid great deference to the rule of the English equity judges on questions of this
sort. See KALES, ESTATES FUTURE INTERESTS § 733 (2d ed. 1920).
But the English judges, themselves, have been unable to advance
logical reasons for the rule. In Gosling v. Gosling, supra, the vicechancellor in supporting the rule of Saunders v. Vautier, supra, 49
Eng. Rep. at 282, said:
If the property is once theirs, [the cestui's] it is useless for the
testator to attempt to impose any fetter upon their enjoyment of it
in full so soon as they attain twenty-one.

But such a statement is a reiteration of the rule, rather than a
reason for the rule.
The truth is, that the problem is not one of legal logic, but one
of public policy; that is to say, to what extent a testator or donor
inter vivos should be allowed to control not only the disposition,
but also the enjoyment of his property. 3 SCOTT, Tn LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 337.3 (1939). The question is: Is there any reason of public
policy against such a trust so insistent that it warrants a rule which
defeats the settlor's intentions?
The court stated in the instant case, 74 A. (2d) at 348:
It is equally difficult to perceive the considerations of policy which
are said to prevent a testator from exercising his judgment and dis-
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cretion by reasonably deferring the unqualified enjoyment of the principal of his devise or bequest without explaining to the beneficiary and
the public his reasons for doing so. .

.

. certainly a period of ten years

does not materially offend public welfare.
Gray argues, GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION § 124

(2d. ed.

1920), that if a creditor or grantee can take possession only at the
time when the trust ends, any sale by the cestui will be highly disadvantageous to him. If the cestui is a spendthrift his position will
be worse than if he had received the property outright as he will be
forced to sell at a ruinous discount. If the cestui is not a spendthrift there is no reason for such a trust. However, it would seem
that such an argument should not be accorded the dignity of a
"compelling public policy" which must override the testator's or
settlor's intentions. Certainly the validity of the trust should not
depend upon the testator's or settlor's wisdom or lack of it, but
upon the inherent reasonableness of the conditions imposed from
a legal standpoint. And as the court said in DeLadson v. Crawford,
supra, 106 AtI. at 328:
. . . the postponement of the enjoyment of the principal of a trust
fund for ten years is not an unreasonable exercise of the undoubted
right of the testator to impose conditions on the enjoyment of his
bounty.

Nor can it be said that such restrictions on the cestui's enjoyment
of the property are always unwise for there is not the danger that
the cestui will spend the property when it is in the hands of the
trustee as there would if it were his own. Claflin v. Ctaflin, supra.
In many cases it may be desirable to place the management of the
property in the hands of one experienced in business matters for
a period beyond the time when the cestui attains the age of twentyone without resorting to a spendthrift trust.
It would seem that the severest charge that can be made against
holding postponement of enjoyment clauses valid is that they are
either harmless, or in the extreme case where the cestui is a spendthrift, unwise. A defeat of the right of the owner of property to
dispose of it in any way he sees fit, so long as such disposition does
not contravene a positive rule of law or violate public policy, for so
trivial a reason ought not to be allowed. It is submitted that the
result in the instant case, giving effect to the testatrix's intention is
correct.
Clifford A. Goodrich, Jr.
WILLS-CARITIES-CHARTABLE BEQUEST FOR MASSES.-Lanza
Ohio St .....
, 92 N. E. (2d) 299 (1949).
v. Di Fronzo et al.. ....
Antonio Di Fronzo, deceased, provided in Item 15 of his last will
and testament as follows: "The balance of my estate to go for
Masses for the repose of the souls of myself and my beloved wife,
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Maria Di Fronzo." Robert F. Lanza, as executor of the last will
and testament of Antonio Di Fronzo, deceased, brought proceedings
against Michele Di Fronzo and others for construction of the will
of the deceased. Certain defendants contended that Item 15 was
ambiguous, uncertain, and without a beneficiary who might enforce
same, and hence, they, as next of kin and heirs at law, should be
entitled to the residue of the estate.
The evidence and testimony in the case which are undisputed,
plainly brought out that the deceased and his wife were devout
Catholics, members of St. Therese's Church, their names being
carried on the records of the parish as such, and that they were
regular attendants, and further that the last rites were administered
to both of them by the pastor of St. Therese's Church. Funeral
services were also held for them at this church. St. Therese's Church,
as one of the defendants, claimed to be entitled to the benefits of
Item 15.
The court laid the foundation for its decision by stating initially
two basic tenets of law applicable to the construction of wills. The
first rule is that which requires a court to ascertain and give effect
to the intent of the testator determined from the whole will. This,
the court does by placing itself in the position of the testator at
the time of the execution of the will. The second rule is that which
admits parol evidence to show the relationship of the testator, and
his affection for those persons who are the natural objects of his
bounty. This is necessary in order to discover the true intention of
the testator. Applying the above rules the court found that it was
the testator's intent to leave a major portion of his estate to be used
for the saying of Masses for the repose of the souls of his wife and
himself.
The crucial question then became whether or not a gift for the
saying of Masses is valid in the State of Ohio. In order to decide
this question several sub-questions demanded the court's attention.
(1) Is a gift for Masses a charitable bequest? This question involves
a consideration of whether such a bequest benefits one individual,
the person for whom the Mass is said, or whether it benefits an
indefinite number of persons, sufficiently numerous to place the bequest on the level of a public benefit. (2) If it is a charitable bequest, does it fail for lack of a beneficiary, seeing that the testator
in his will neglected to mention anyone who might receive the money?
In the present case the court gave its answer to these questions by
holding that: (1) the gift was a charitable bequest; (2) the Mass
benefits a large number of people in addition to the testator and his
wife for whom the Masses would be offered; and, (3) the bequest
would not fail for lack of a trustee since the court could correct the
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omission by ordering the executor of the decedent's will to pay the
funds to St. Therese's Church.
These same questions have been answered in a number of conflicting decisions during the past fifty years in Ohio and in other
jurisdictions. However, it seems that the difficulty has not been so
much that the bequests have failed, as that the courts have neglected to comprehend fully the necessary incidents of such essentials
as the nature of the Mass, the function of Mass stipends, and the
historical development of charitable bequests. The result has been
inconsistent opinions expressed by courts on matters which should
be uniform wherever decided.
Prior to examining the cases in the United States, we shall
examine briefly, the early English law, which, at the time of the
Reformation, militated against bequests for Masses for the dead.
Although during the reign of Queen Elizabeth statutes outlawed the
celebration of the Mass, yet these did not affect the disposition of
property for this purpose. Bourne v. Keane, [1919] A. C. 815, 845.
By 1835 the Roman Catholic Relief Acts of 1791, 31 Geo. 3, c. 32,
and of 1829, 10 Geo. 4, c. 7, (repealed by the Roman Catholic
Relief Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 55), and the Roman Catholic
Charities Act of 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 115, had set the stage for
the decision of Sir Charles Pepys, in West v. Shuttleworth, 2 My. &
K. 684, 39 Eng. Rep. 1106 (1835). At the time this case was
brought the celebration of the Mass was no longer illegal, and freedom of worship had been granted to Catholics. They could acquire
and hold property for schools, religious worship, education and
charitable purposes, subject to the mortmain statutes. In the West
case, it was held that bequests in trust for the saying of Masses
were void as a superstitious use. It was also decided that such
bequests were not charitable since the testatrix herself intended to
secure all the benefit, and did not intend to benefit the priests individually or the church generally.
West v. Shuttlewortk, supra, authority for almost seventy-five
years, was overruled in 1919 by the House of Lords in Bourne v.
Keane, supra. It was held in this case that a bequest of a personal
estate to have Masses said for the dead was not void as a gift to
superstitious uses. This was only a partial closing of the door on
the old rule, however, since the question of whether or not such
gifts were charitable was left as previously decided in the West case.
The door was left partially open until 1934 when the English
courts closed it by ruling that such bequests were for a charitable
use. In Lindeboom v. Camille, [1934] 1 Ch. 162, Luxmore, J., in
an excellent opinion, left no doubt that the mistakes and misconceptions concerning the nature of the Mass would not be duplicated
in English courts again.
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The courts of the United States have not been bothered by the
problem which confronted their English brethren prior to 1919. Since
this country was founded on safeguards which guaranteed religious
liberty, the doctrine of superstitious uses which arose under the
Chantries Act, 1547, 1 Edw. 6, c. 14, has never been the basis of
barring bequests for Masses in the United States. Hoeffer v. Clogan,
171 Ill. 462, 49 N. E. 527 (1898).
In the case under discussion Judge Brewer has based his finding
that the testator's bequest is for a charitable use on the solid foundation of authoritative Church treatises in addition to a number of
outstanding decisions wherein the nature of the Mass was painstakingly examined in order to determine whether or not the benefit
of the Mass was general and public or confined to the soul for whom
it was offered. In re Kavanaugh's Estate, 143 Wis. 90, 126 N. W.
672 (1910), and cases cited therein; Delaware Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 27 Del. Ch. 101, 31 A. (2d) 383 (Ch. 1943); 10 CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA 19 (1913); GiHR, THE HOLY SACRIFICE OF THE MASS
(11th ed. 1935). The doctrine of the Catholic Church is expressed
in the Kavanaugh case, supra, 126 N. W. at 675, as follows:
According to the doctrine of the Catholic Church as established by
the proof in this case, the whole church profits by every mass, since
the prayers of the mass include all of the faithful, living and dead.
The sacrifice of the mass contemplates that all mankind shall participate
in its benefits and fruit. The mass is the unbloody sacrifice of the
cross and the object for which it is offered up is in the first place, to
honor and glorify God; secondly, to thank Him for His favors; third,
to ask His blessing; fourth, to propitiate Him for the sins of all mankind. The individuals who participate in the fruits of this mass are the
person or persons for whom the mass is offered, all of those who
assist at the mass, the celebrant himself, and for all mankind, within
or without the fold of the church.

This method of reasoning to substantiate charitable bequests has
received the sanction of the majority of courts in the United States
today. 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS § 376 (1935). Nevertheless, the court,
in the case of Sherman v. Baker, 20 R. I. 446, 40 Atl. 11 (1898),
stated that there is a diversity of opinion as to the execution of
bequests for Masses. According to the Sherman case: "One class
holds that they are good as charitable trusts, being for religious
services." This seems to be the more prevalent view and is illustrated by the following cases: Sedgwick v. National Savings and
Trust Co. et al., 130 F. (2d) 440 (D. C. Cir. 1942); In re Hamilton's Estate, 181 Cal. 758, 186 Pac. 587 (1919), distinguishing In re
Lennon's Estate, 152 Cal. 327, 92 Pac. 870 (1907), on the ground
that that decision was based on the proposition that the bequest
was for the benefit of the testator alone, which was a question of fact
not controlling in the Hamilton case; Hoeffer v. Clogan, 171 Il1. 462,
49 N. W. 527 (1898); Ackerman v. Fichter, 179 Ind. 392, 101 N. E.
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493 (1913); Obrecht v. Pujos, 206 Ky. 751, 268 S. W. 564 (1925);
In re Schouler, 134 Mass. 426 (1883); Webster v. Sughrow, 69 N. H.
380, 45 Atl. 139 (1898); Moran v. Kelly, 95 N. J. Eq. 380, 124
Atl. 67, aff'd, 96 N. J. Eq. 699, 126 Ati. 924 (1924); Kerrigan v.
Tabb et al., 39 Atl. 701 (N. J. Ch. 1898); In re Morris, 227 N. Y.
141, 124 N. E. 724 (1919); In re Kavanaugh's Estate, supra, overruling McHugh v. McCole, 97 Wis. 166, 72 N. W. 631 (1897).
The court continued in the Sherman case, supra: "Another class
holds that they are private trusts, which are void because there is no
living beneficiary to enforce the trust." This statement is illustrated
by the case of Festorazzi v. St. Joseph's Roman Catholic Church,
104 Ala. 327, 18 So. 394 (1893).
The court further said: "A third class holds that they are good
as outright gifts for a specified legal object." In re Ward's Estate,
125 Cal. App. 717, 14 P. (2d) 91 (1932); In re Lennon's Estate,
supra; Matter of Zimmerman, 22 Misc. 411, 50 N. Y. S. 395 (1898);
Sherman v. Baker, supra.
To these three classes a fourth can be added, illustrated by the
Iowa case of Moran v. Moran, 104 Iowa 216, 73 N. W. 617 (1897).
This case held that a private trust was created which would be
valid although not charitable.
The principal case has been placed in the class which upholds
the majority view. As was stated in the opinion, only two reported
decisions were found from Ohio. Neither of these were of aid to the
court. In re Estate of Riley, 138 Ohio St. 145, 33 N. E. (2d) 987
(1941), did not raise the question of whether a gift for Masses was
valid as a charitable use or not. Fugman v. Theobald, 12 Ohio Cir.
Dec. 720, was reversed in 64 Ohio St. 473, 60 N. E. 606 (1901),
the upper court sustaining a gift for the saying of Masses as a direct
gift to a priest.
It seems unquestionable that the Lanza case will be followed in
Ohio in the future and that it is bound to be cited by courts in
other jurisdictions as similar cases arise, not only as authority in
cases where a testator has failed to designate either a priest or church
to accept his bequest for Masses, but also for its sound exposition
of the nature of the Mass.
Edward J. Van Tassel
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EFFECT OF EXTRATERRITORIAL PROVISIONS IN STATE COMPENSATION STATUTES.-Daniels v. Trailer Trans-

port Co.. .... Mich ..... , 42 N. W. (2d) 828 (1950). The plaintiff,
LeRoy Daniels, an Illinois resident, went to Texas and secured employment with defendant, Trailer Transport Co. The transport company had its home office in Michigan, but carried on its operations
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in several states. The plaintiff, in entering his employment with the
defendant, signed forms whereby he agreed to comply with all the
requirements and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the insurance companies, and the Trailer Transport Company.
He also elected to be bound and subject to the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Law of the State of Michigan. The plaintiff, during the course of his employment, worked in six states for
the defendant. While in such employment, he was severely injured
in Tennessee and voluntarily was awarded compensation under the
Tennessee act. He then sought compensation in Michigan, where the
Workmen's Compensation Commission awarded him weekly compen,ation for total disability, less credit for the amounts paid under the
Tennessee act. The defendants, the Trailer Transport Company, and
the Pacific Employers Insurance Company, appealed the Michigan
Commission's decision granting the award. The court held that when
a Michigan corporation employs a non-resident by a contract made
outside of the state, the Workmen's Compensation Act does not
apply and the Commission has no jurisdiction to award or deny
compensation for injuries to such an employee. The jurisdiction of
the commission can neither be extended nor limited by agreement.
The problem presented was one of first impression in Michigan
in which the court had to decide whether a non-resident, not employed in the state, whose contract was entered into and whose injury occurred outside of the state, was entitled to recovery under
the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act.
At common law it was usually held that the law of the state
wherein the accident occurred was the law to be applied to the
litigation of negligence cases. When workmen's compensation statutes
were first enacted, it was only natural to apply the same principle:
that is, the action is confined to the limits of the state in which the
injury occurred. This is often referred to as the "tort" or "territorial" theory in which it is held, that unless the legislature had indicated expressly or impliedly a contrary intent, a compensation act
is presumed to have no extraterritorial effect. Tomalin v. S. Pearson
& Son, Limited, [1909] 2 K. B. 61. This theory seems to have
influenced the Massachusetts court in deciding In re Gould, 215
Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693 (1913), the first case in the United States
construing a workmen's compensation statute, and which held that
the Massachusetts Act had no extraterritorial effect. The position
has found very little support in this country with the exception of
Sheehan Pipe Line Construction Co. v. State Industrial Commission,
151 Okla. 272, 3 P. (2d) 199 (1931). In fact the Massachusetts
position has since been changed by statute. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 152,
§ 26 (1950), construed in McLaughlin's Case, 274 Mass. 217, 174
N. E. 338 (1931). With regard to the change of the common law
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rule by statutory enactment, Mr. Justice Sutherland speaking for the
Supreme Court in Cudahy Packing Co. of Nebraska v. Parramore,
263 U. S. 418, 423, 48 S. Ct. 153, 68 L. Ed. 366 (1923), stated:
The modern development and growth of industry, with the consequent changes in the relations of employer and employee, have been
so profound in character and degree as to take away, in large measure,
the applicability of the doctrines upon which rest the common law
liability . . . leaving of necessity a field of debatable ground where
a good deal must be conceded in favor of forms of legislation, calculated to establish new bases of liability more in harmony with these
changed conditions.

Numerous states have statutory provisions of similar import to
that of the Michigan statute, precluding extraterritorial effect of the
statute except in cases both where the injured employee is a resident
of the state and the contract of employment was made within the
state. Cases construing such statutes are: Severing et al. v. Industrial Commission et al., 363 I1. 217, 2 N. E. (2d) 65 (1936); Elkhart Sawmill Co. v. Skinner, 111 Ind. App. 695, 42 N. E. (2d) 412
(1942); Liggett and Myers Tobacco Co. v. Goslin, 163 Md. 74,
160 Atl. 804 (1932); Ritenour v. Creamery Service Inc., 19 N. J.
Misc. 82, 17 A. (2d) 283 (1941); Raiola v. Union Stevedoring
Corp., 268 App. Div. 837, 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 242 (1944); Buhler v.
Maddison, 105 Utah 39, 140 P. (2d) 933 (1943).
The court, in the instant case, was governed by MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 17.193 which provides that:
The industrial action board shall 'have jurisdiction over all controversies arising out of injuries suffered without the territorial limits of
this state, in those cases where the injured employe is a resident of
this state at the time of the injury, and the contract of hire was made
in this state, and any such employe or his dependents shall be entitled
to the compensation or death benefits provided by this act.

The court decided that the factual situation did not bring it within
the provisions of the statute, and therefore the compensation commission exceeded its jurisdiction in the granting of the award.
Neither statutory condition was met as plaintiff was not a resident
of the state of Michigan at the time of the injury, nor was the
contract of hire made in the state. There is no support for the plaintiff's argument that the section is only a portion of the procedural
part of the act. The Supreme Court of Michigan, in construing the
above statute in an earlier case, Cline v. Byrne Doors, Inc., 324
Mich. 540, 37 N. W. (2d) 630, 633 (1949), held that under the
provisions in the Michigan statute the claimant's right to compensation depends on whether he was employed by virtue of a contract
of hire made in the state.
Some jurisdictions have extraterritorial provisions in their statutes,
enacted to protect those employed in the state who are incidentally

